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The Birth of a Logical System:
Thurman Arnold and the Making of Modern Administrative Law
Abstract
Much of what we recognize as contemporary administrative law emerged during the
1920s and 1930s, a period when a group of legal academics attempted to aid Progressive Era and
New Deal regulatory efforts by crafting a legitimating system for the federal administrative state.
Their system assigned competent, expert institutions—most notably administrative agencies and
the judiciary—well-defined roles: Agencies would utilize their vast, specialized knowledge and
abilities to correct market failures, while courts would provide a limited but crucial oversight of
agency operations. This Article focuses both on this first generation of administrative law
scholarship, which included most prominently Felix Frankfurter and James Landis, and on the
contemporaneous challenge to their work raised by the legal realist Thurman Arnold. Arnold
characterized early modern administrative law as a quasi-formalist effort to impose a logical
system of procedure and judicial review on what he saw as pragmatic, functional regulatory
agencies that were attempting to address the crisis of the Depression. Although he conceded the
persuasive power of this logical system, Arnold predicted that its requirements, especially for
adversarial litigation and judicial review, would ultimately impede the optimal operations of a
modern administrative state. Although Arnold’s eclectic alternative proposals had no influence,
his predictions and critique remain incisive and relevant to an academic field and body of
doctrine that regularly face regular bouts of intellectual and political crisis.
The Article carries the historical disagreement between Arnold and his contemporaries
into the present by connecting their debates first to the development of legal process theory as an
approach to federal courts and constitutional law in the 1950s and then to similar debates in
administrative law today. Arnold’s challenge to early modern administrative law, the Article
argues, remains relevant because American law still demands a systemic, legalistic conception of
the administrative state. A logical system of administrative and legal process has enormous
symbolic power even though, as its current detractors note, it often produces suboptimal
regulatory practices. The recurring conflict between an enormously durable system and its
critique, a conflict that continues to drive administrative law scholarship, began in the 1920s and
1930s; any efforts to reform the field should understand the terms and implications of the
conflict’s foundations.
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Huge treatises are now appearing showing the compatibility of administrative
justice with the law. Just as theology was not able to exist without a Redeemer,
so the “law” must have its equity or its administrative law in order to save
mankind from the consequences of its logical systems.
- Thurman Arnold (1935)1

Since their origins in the Depression, the practice, teaching, and study of modern
administrative law have continued to develop in the midst of debates over how to resolve
conflicts between a dominant set of legal doctrines and external political demands. Over the past
half-century or more, periodic administrative legitimacy crises have spawned an academic
literature consisting of authoritative, influential articles that clarify embryonic doctrines and
theories.2 The now-familiar rhythm of such outbursts began with modern administrative law’s
widespread emergence in the 1930s, when federal regulatory agencies became sufficiently
prevalent to warrant extensive attention from legal academics.3 Administrative law histories
have established this fairly well-known story: Academics sympathetic to the Roosevelt
Administration, including most prominently Felix Frankfurter and the young professors who had
taken his classes at Harvard Law School, provided the theoretical and doctrinal bases for the
Administration’s efforts to address the vast market failures wrought by the Depression.4 In
doing so, this first generation of scholars launched administrative law as a basic part of the law
1

THURMAN ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 64 (1935)[hereinafter SYMBOLS].
The period of greatest ferment was the mid-1970s, when three influential critiques of administrative law
appeared: James O. Freedman, Crisis and Legitimacy in the Administrative Process, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1041 (1975);
Robert Rabin, Administrative Law in Transition: A Discipline in Search of an Organizing Principle, 72 NW. U. L.
REV. 120 (1977)[hereinafter Transition]; Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1668 (1975)[hereinafter Reformation]. This ferment was neither unprecedented, see HENRY
FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: THE NEED FOR BETTER DEFINITION OF STANDARDS (1962),
nor the last word, see CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
BUREAUCRACY (1990); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543, 545-49
(2000).
3
See Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1252-53
(1986)[hereinafter Historical Perspectives].
2
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school curriculum and a popular subject of academic legal research. More important, they put in
place a particular ideological and conceptual approach to the subject, one that continues to shape
the theory and practice of administrative law today.5 For first generation administrative law
scholars, the correct legal and administrative processes and structure would lead inexorably to
superior law and policies. Their presumptions about both the peculiar competencies of
administrative agencies and the limited but still im
portant role of the judicial review of agency
action continue to underpin the conceptual and doctrinal dimensions of the field.
These scholars faced opposition in their own time, most famously from elite members of
the legal community who—seeking to protect their clients, their status and business, and/or their
legal culture—sought to challenge the political and legal legitimacy of new and expanded federal
regulatory programs.6 But they also faced a critique from an unlikely source within the legal
academy: Thurman Arnold, a member of the Yale Law School faculty associated with the legal
realists.7 Like the first generation of administrative law scholars, Arnold was an advocate of
federal regulation and especially of the New Deal, but unlike his contemporaries at Harvard, he
was deeply suspicious of comprehensive solutions based upon structural and procedural systems.
His brief but evocative writings on the subject represent a singular effort to bring realism’s

4

See, e.g., STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY: PROBLEMS,
TEXT, AND CASES 21-24 (5th ed. 2002); G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 103-08, 11416 (2000)[hereinafter CONSTITUTION].
5
See WILLIAM C. CHASE, THE AMERICAN LAW SCHOOL AND THE RISE OF ADMINISTRATIVE GOVERNMENT
(1982); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL
ORTHODOXY 213-25 (1992); WHITE, CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 103-08; Thomas O. Sargentich, Teaching
Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 1 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 147, 150-54 (1992); Stewart, Reformation,
supra note 2, at 1677-78.
6
See RONEN SHAMIR, MANAGING LEGAL UNCERTAINTY: ELITE LAWYERS IN THE NEW DEAL (1995); George
B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U.
L. REV. 1557, 1571-72 (1996); Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Legal Profession and the Development of Administrative
Law, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1119 (1997).
7
The best current source of biographical information on Arnold is Gene M. Gressley, Introduction, in
VOLTAIRE AND THE COWBOY: THE LETTERS OF THURMAN ARNOLD 1 (Gene M. Gressley ed., 1977)[hereinafter
VOLTAIRE AND THE COWBOY]. A full-length biography by Spencer Webber Waller is forthcoming from NYU Press.
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insights to the judicial review of federal administrative agencies.8 Arnold argued that society is
shaped by a deep-seated desire for stable and authoritative legal and political symbols, and he
proposed an eclectic mix of creative means to enable the growth of an administrative state, one
that would be sufficiently free of legal constraints to attack what he considered the root causes of
the Depression.
Both early proponents of the federal administrative state and their critics shared the
assumption that the “supremacy of law” undergirding a liberal democracy required the judiciary
and administrative agencies to operate within separate but interdependent spheres—even if they
disagreed as to whether the judiciary’s role was to uphold or strike down agency decisions.9 By
contrast, Arnold called for abandoning the separate domains of agency regulation and judicial
review in favor of more functional, flexible relationships between courts and agencies,
relationships that would include both institutional partnerships and greater agency independence.
This departure from the consensus of his day reflected Arnold’s commitment to two of realism’s
core tendencies: a deep-rooted distrust of formal distinctions and a restless quest for practical
solutions to the functional impasses caused by unreflective formalist assumptions. The solutions
Arnold proposed to the inefficiencies and irrationalities caused by judicial review were thus both
critical and reconstructive, and opposed the formalities of legal system-building.10

8

See JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY CLAIMS 11-14 (1983)
[hereinafter BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE].
9
The popular notion of “judicial supremacy,” which presumes the judiciary’s authority to provide a final
review of legal and especially constitutional questions, became prominent during the 1890s with the early stirrings
of the administrative state, and was tied during that time to classical legal formalism and laissez faire ideology. See
ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT 253 (1992); STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW
AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877-1920, at 152-53 (1982);
William E. Nelson, Commentary, Changing Conceptions of Judicial Review: The Evolution of Constitutional
Theory in the States: 1790- 1860, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 1166, 1182-85 (1972); cf. Barry Friedman, The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficult, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 339-42 (1998)
(placing the term’s earliest rise in popularity in the early and mid-nineteenth century).
10
This anti-systemic tendency extended to sarcastic criticism of the American Law Institute’s common law
restatement project. See Thurman W. Arnold, The Restatement of the Law of Trusts, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 800
(1931).
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Arnold resisted what he termed the “logical system” of administrative law, with its
acceptance of a central role for judicial review, even as he recognized the judiciary as a
necessary, if merely symbolic and ideological, component of the modern administrative state.
Like the first generation scholars and their critics, he too saw the inevitability of law’s
institutional “supremacy,” but assumed that any effort to retain judicial review would inevitably
sink agency discretion. In the “trial by combat” of litigation, courts would always emerge the
symbolic superior to any party appearing before them, whether individual, agency, or
Congress.11 The only way to protect fledgling administrative agencies, therefore, was to avoid
the combat in any way possible.
Arnold’s proposed alternatives to trial by combat were dead on arrival and his critique of
administrative law has largely been ignored, even as his anti-formalist criticism has remained
current and popular.12 But his work was more than an historical anomaly. It was prophetic. He
saw that the emerging approach advocated by his contemporaries featured a comprehensive,
formal system that would successfully utilize prevailing symbols to legitimate administrative
agencies. He also correctly predicted the costs of creating a formal structure that would
ultimately limit administrative discretion and regulatory flexibility. Equally significant, his work
illuminates two fundamental, related, and relatively unexplored aspects of the past and present of
administrative law, aspects which in turn explain the cyclical tendencies of scholars in the field
to find crisis and resolution in its familiar and flexible structures.
First, his critique and the debate it sparked between himself and Felix Frankfurter starkly
reveals modern administrative law’s procedural core and its precursor relationship to the legal

11

Thurman Arnold, Trial by Combat and the New Deal, 47 HARV. L. REV. 913 (1934) [hereinafter Trial by
Combat].
12
See Mark Fenster, The Symbols of Governance: Thurman Arnold and Post-Realist Legal Theory, 51 BUFF.
L. REV. 1053, 1056-57 (2003).
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process theory that would become, in the post-war period, the dominant post-realist approach to
legal scholarship and teaching. Arnold rejected any fundamental or functional distinctions
between the judiciary and agencies as institutions of governance except insofar as they served the
symbolic dimensions of governance. He also showed little faith in process as a necessary and
sufficient means to a functional administrative state. Rather, he saw procedural doctrines in the
same way that a wily, creative attorney does: as a tool to move a decisionmaker to a desired
outcome. Process, form, and structure were secondary to substantive policy and functional
results. It was in response to Arnold, as well as to opponents of the New Deal expansion of the
regulatory state, that first generation scholars began to articulate the concepts of process-centered
jurisprudence, of limited, reasoned judicial review, and of institutional competencies—concepts
now associated with legal process theory—as justifications both for the rise of administrative
agencies and for the continuing (though limited) importance of judicial review of agency action.
Juxtaposing the first generation scholars’ work to Arnold’s critique, then, makes plain the core
commitments of modern administrative law—both in the moment at which they emerged and in
the later appearance and success of legal process theory. In this light, administrative law appears
less a realist effort to create a pragmatic, problem-solving legal regime and academic discipline,
and more a traditional effort to apply recognizable, comprehensive, formal legal structures and
methods to an emergent area of law and government.
Second, reinserting Arnold’s critique into the historical trajectory of administrative law
enables a better understanding of how the first generation scholars set in motion a systematic
approach that is sufficiently abstract, flexible, comprehensive, and familiar to have contained the
political and conceptual challenges to the administrative state that have unfolded over the past
fifty years. Although first generation scholars recognized the dangers of judicial review for
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administrative agencies—this debate took place, after all, at the height of the controversy
surrounding the Supreme Court’s finding some New Deal regulatory programs
unconstitutional—they advocated a system based on the judiciary’s ultimate supremacy over
agency competence in developing expert policy. Like the first generation, succeeding
generations of administrative law scholars have identified particular crises of legitimacy,
governance, and functionality in regulatory agencies, and have posited new models of judicial
and administrative processes that can better serve the needs of their times. Though certainly not
without merit or beneficial effects, such efforts have typically offered to resolve the external
crises they identify by redefining internal institutional competencies and rejiggering the relative
authority of the judiciary and the internal procedures of administrative agencies. Such reforms
reaffirm an earlier faith in a structural solution to the challenge of the regulatory state, one based
upon administrative and legal process and overseen ultimately by the judiciary. To break this
conceptual log jam and remake the field of administrative law, more recent scholarship has
sought to change the first generation’s model, often borrowing methods and theories offered by
other academic disciplines. In doing so, this scholarship has taken up, unknowingly, Arnold’s
original challenge, and faces the same conceptual impasse and settled institutions and doctrines
as Arnold faced, as further calcified by the field’s long history.
To illuminate the comparison between Arnold and the consensus on administrative law
that emerged in the 1920s and 1930s, the Article begins in Part I of this Article presents first
generation scholars’ successful efforts to legitimate a vision of agency expertise and judicial
review. Part II turns to Arnold’s competing vision of administrative law, first summarizing the
broad themes of his approach to law and governance, and then focusing on his critique of
conventional notions of judicial review within administrative law and his various proposals for a
less formal and more flexible approach. Part III discusses the first generation scholars’ debate
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with Arnold in correspondence and published scholarship, a debate that illuminates what both
sides saw as the stakes of their proposed visions of modern administrative law. Parts IV and V
consider the implications of this debate for the historiography of administrative law as a field of
legal academic endeavor. Part IV demonstrates the conceptual connections between first
generation scholarship and the legal process theory that emerged in the post- war period, and
recounts Arnold’s intervention in 1960 against what he saw as legal process advocates’
conservative formalism—an intervention in which he revisited the arguments he initially made as
modern administrative law emerged. Part V considers the continuities between first generation
scholarship and more recent administrative law scholarship, as well as between Arnold’s dissent
and current critiques of the field.
I.
An Administrative and Judicial Process:
First Generation Administrative Law Scholarship
At the height of legal realism, administrative law was a nascent academic enterprise, as
well as an embryonic practice area of federal law.13 Significant federal statutory mandates for
regulatory programs whose implementation was overseen by administrative agencies (as well as
myriad state regulatory agencies overseeing state programs) had been in place since the Populist
and Progressive Eras. Despite this fact, the modern federal administrative state—envisioned as a
response to and check upon market failure—did not begin in earnest until the early New Deal.14
Unsurprisingly, then, as late as 1937, only a bare majority of accredited law schools offered one
or more courses in administrative law.15 And even though numerous important agencies,
including the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Federal Trade Commission, had fully

13
14
15

See A.H. Feller, Prospectus for the Further Study of Federal Administrative Law, 47 YALE L.J. 647 (1938).
See Rabin, Historical Perspective, supra note 3, at 1243-53.
See Arthur T. Vanderbilt, The Bar and the Public, 23 AM. BAR. ASSN. J. 871, 874 (1937).
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established themselves by the time of the New Deal,16 the Roosevelt Administration faced
enormous resistance from elite segments of the legal profession as it attempted to expand the
number and scope of the federal regulatory bureaucracy.17 Attorneys and jurists increasingly
accepted federal administrative agencies as essential elements of American governance during
the early part of the twentieth century, despite their apparently anomalous position within
traditional, formalist conceptions of the constitutional order. But the acceptance was grudging,
and the legal legitimacy of the administrative state and its operations remained the subject of
vigorous debate.18
A.

Precursors to the First Generation.

Legal academics in the early twentieth century had developed a number of competing
approaches to the emerging field. All shared the general commitment of the Progressive Era to
address large scale economic and social issues through legislative regulatory programs
administered by government bureaucracies rather than through common law causes of action
adjudicated by courts. Writing in the Harvard Law Review in 1936, JusticeHarlan Fiske Stone
described this shift as “a substitution made necessary, not by want of an applicable law, but
because the ever-expanding activities of government in dealing with the complexities of modern
life had made indispensable the adoption of procedures more expeditious and better guided by
specialized experience than any which the courts had provided.”19

16

See Act of Feb. 4, 1887, 24 Stat. 379, 383 (establishing Interstate Commerce Commission); Act of Sept. 26,
1914, 38 Stat. 717 (establishing Federal Trade Commission). See generally WHITE, CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at
98-103 (describing how administrative agencies such as the Interstate Commerce Commission had grown in power
and achieved some measure of popular and judicial acceptance during the early part of the twentieth century).
17
See sources cited supra note 6.
18
See WHITE, CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 96-108.
19
Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV. 4, 16 (1936). On Progressive
Era political commitments and their relationship to academics studying government and administrative law, see
JAMES T. KLOPPENBERG, UNCERTAIN VICTORY: SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND PROGRESSIVISM IN EUROPEAN AND
AMERICAN THOUGHT, 1870-1920, at 361-63, 383-85 (1986); William J. Novak, The Legal Origins of the Modern
American State, in LOOKING BACK AT LAW’S CENTURY 249 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2002).
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The least important of these approaches within law schools was that associated with
Frank Goodnow of Columbia University’s Law School and Government department, a leading
Progressive advocate of administrative agencies, and teacher of the first administrative law
course taught in a law school.20 Goodnow’s legal scholarship sought to enable regulatory bodies
to operate free of the narrow constitutional constraints that courts used to limit congressional
legislation and delegation.21 His approach was largely an internal one that studied how
administrative officers applied and executed statutes, and focused less on common law
development by the judiciary, which was the traditional focus of the legal academy.22 Goodnow
ultimately became better known as a founder of the academic discipline Political Science (or
Government) and for developing the empirical study of government institutions.23
A second approach that was more cognizable and much better-known within the legal
academia of the 1920s and 1930s was that of Ernst Freund. Like Goodnow, Freund had worked
in law schools and political science departments, and had also served in government agencies.24
Freund also shared with Goodnow a commitment to Progressive politics, and called both for
increased governmental reliance on technical, scientific professionals to make expert
20

See DOROTHY ROSS, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE (1991); Novak, supra note 19, at 249;
Richard M. Thomas, Deprofessionalization and the Postmodern State of Administrative Law Pedagogy, 42 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 75, 75 n.6 (1992).
21
See Novak, supra note 19, at 258, 271-72.
22
Goodnow’s most significant treatise on administrative law was intended for students of “politics.” FRANK
J. GOODNOW, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, at iv (1905). The treatise
spent only the first of its six “books,” and part of another, and less than a third of its pages, on specifically legal
issues, concentrating instead on the forms and practices of administration and the work of administrative officers.
See also John A. Fairlie, Public Administration and Administrative Law, in ESSAYS ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF
GOVERNMENTAL ADMINISTRATION: A VOLUME IN HONOR OF FRANK JOHNSON GOODNOW 3, 28-30 (Charles G.
Haines & Marshall E. Dimock eds., 1935) (contrasting Goodnow’s approach to the more legal approaches of Ernst
Freund, Bruce Wyman, and others within legal academia).
23
See JAMES HART, AN INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 4-5 (1940); Introduction: Frank J.
Goodnow, in ESSAYS ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF GOVERNMENTAL ADMINISTRATION supra note 22
, at v, x.
24
See OSCAR KRAINES, THE WORLD AND IDEAS OF ERNST FREUND 2-8 (1974). An illustration of Goodnow’s
distance from the traditional legal academy is the apocryphal tale of Thomas Reed Powell, who described the
experience of studying under Goodnow in the early years of the twentieth century after having attended Harvard
Law School, as one in which he had been “de-Harvardized.” LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-60,
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administrative decisions divorced from the corruption of politics, and for a field of administrative
law to legitimate and assist in the “legislative regulation of economic activity.”25 He explicitly
encouraged legal academics to study administrative agencies and to assist them in discerning
their broad legislative mandates.26
Freund focused especially on systems of public administration, on the specific powers
(such as licensing and ratemaking) that public officers and agencies wielded, and on statutory
27
and common law bases for judicial review of administrative action. The latter constituted a

“strictly legal discipline” and had become the subject matter of the legal academy; public
administration, by contrast, was an extra-legal realm considered by professors of Government
and Political Science.28 In this regard, he sought to bridge what he described as the differentiated
study of administrative organization and administrative powers, the former of which focused on
optimizing internal public administration and the latter of which performed the “more strictly
legal” task of protecting “right and justice” through external judicial institutions.29 In his
instruction on the internal functions of administration, Freund’s work focused students’ attention
on the workaday world of government officials and attorneys, and served the traditional role of
introducing “the rank and file of the bar-to-be to methods of legal thinking, to the fundamental

at 50 (1986)[hereinafter LEGAL REALISM]. On the importance of Freund’s and Goodnow’s work to the development
of a pre-New Deal public law, see Novak, supra note 19
, at 255.
25
Ernst Freund, Historical Survey, in THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 9, 20 (Ernst Freund
et al. eds., 1923)(hereinafter Historical Survey). Freund’s approach itself had its precedents; treatise author and state
supreme court justice Thomas Cooley, for example, was a nineteenth century precursor of Freund. See Paul D.
Carrington, Law and Economics in the Creation of Federal Administrative Law: Thomas Cooley, Elder to the
Republic, 83 IOWA L. REV. 363, 387- 88 (1998).
26
Freund, Historical Survey, supra note 25
, at 39; Ernst Freund, The Correlation of Work for Higher degrees
in Graduate Schools and Law Schools, 11 ILL. L. REV. 308 (1916).
27
See Oliver O. Field, The Study of Administrative Law: A Review and a Proposal, 18 IOWA L. REV. 233,
234-35 (1933).
28
Ernst Freund, Administrative Law, 1 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 452, 455 (Edwin R. A.
Seligman ed., 1932).
29
Id.

13

rules, to the elements of procedure.”30 This approach remained an important one to the legal
academy and to the bar, as faculty focused on the vocational aspects of administrative law
31
through the case method, and as leading members of the bar called for greater attention in law

teaching to “the principles and methods of procedure in administrative law cases” within
agencies.32
In his more traditional legal academic work, Freund presented a curiously conservative
approach for a committed Progressive.33 His early casebook on administrative law used casebased training methods to emphasize the various common law means by which individuals could
seek relief from judicial action.34 But his understanding of the constitutional and legislative
limits of administrative agencies was quite constrained. To Freund, legislatures strictly limited
agency discretion within a statutory framework, and any agency efforts to regulate beyond its
statutory mandate that affected individual liberty or property rights was “hardly conformable to
the ‘Rule of Law.’”35 At the same time, he considered it appropriate for legislatures to delegate
authority only to agencies that concerned uncontroverted issues of policy or opinion.36 In the

30

See Maurice H. Merrill, Three Possible Approaches to the Study of Administrative Law, 18 IOWA L. REV.
228, 232 (1932)[hereinafter Approaches].
31
See Field, supra note 27, at 235; Paul L. Sayre, A Common Law of Administrative Powers, 18 IOWA L.
REV. 241, 247 (1933). After Freund’s death, his successor at the University of Chicago, Kenneth Sears, published a
similar casebook that provided a remedy-based, functional approach and limited consideration of the larger
constitutional issues on which Frankfurter and Davison’s casebook focused. See KENNETH C. SEARS, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW at vii-viii (1938).
32
See O. R. McGuire, Reforms Needed in the Teaching of Administrative Law, 6 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 171,
176-78 (1937). During this period, McGuire was chairman of the ABA’s Special Committee on Administrative Law
that was developing a proposal for a specialized administrative court to hear appeals from agency adjudications. See
Daniel R. Ernst, Dicey’s Disciple on the D.C. Circuit: Judge Harold Stephens and Administrative Law Reform,
1933-1940, 90 GEO. L.J.787, 790 -93 (2002).
33
Freund’s commitment to Progressivism was real but cautious. See KRAINES, supra note 24
, at 93 -94.
34
See Merrill, Approaches, supra note 30
, at 228; Fairlie, supra note 22
, at 28 -29.
35
Freund, Historical Survey, supra note 25
, at 22 -23; see also Ernst Freund, The Substitution of Rule for
Discretion in Public Law, 9 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 666, 670 (1915) (“[F]or in a government by law discretion ought to
have a very limited place in administration.”). Freund’s position was subject to vigorous criticism from, among
others, Dean John Wigmore of Northwestern. See generally John H. Wigmore, The Dangers of Administrative
Discretion, 19 ILL. L. REV. 440, 441 (1925) (arguing for control rather than reduction of administrative discretion).
36
See ERNST FREUND, ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY 218-221 (1928).
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absence of such consensus, Freund argued, legislatures should control private activity directly by
statute, without administrative enforcement.
B.

37

The First Generation.

The approach that was beginning to dominate legal academia during the early twentieth
century, established at Harvard in the century’s first decade, opposed both Freund’s narrow
vision of administrative discretion and his focus on the judicial review of statutory and common
law issues.38 Harvard Law School dean Roscoe Pound and professors Bruce Wyman and
Thomas Reed Powell in the first quarter of the century,39 and, later and more clearly, Harvard
professor Felix Frankfurter and his students (most prominently James Landis—himself later dean
of Harvard) were the leading legal academic theorists who helped develop the most influential
modern conception of administrative law.40 To varying extents, and with Frankfurter and Landis
37

See ibid.
See WHITE, CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 107. Cf. CHASE, supra note 5 (alleging that Frankfurter, with
the help of his students, purposefully subverted Freund’s approach and, to an extent, his career).
39
See BRUCE WYMAN, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1903); Roscoe Pound, Executive Justice, 46
AM. L. REG. 144 (1907); Pound, The Growth of Administrative Justice, 2 WISC. L. REV. 321 (1924)[hereinafter
Pound, Growth]; Thomas Reed Powell, Administrative Exercise of the Police Power [Parts I and II], 24 HARV. L.
REV. 268 & 333 (1910). Pound would later adamantly oppose the New Deal and administrative discretion, and
single out first generation scholars for withering, often excessive criticism. See Paul Verkuil, The Emerging
Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 268-71 (1978).
40
See Sayre, supra note 31,at 241 -42 (describing Frankfurter’s influence on the then-present generation of
legal academics teaching and writing on administrative law). On Frankfurter’s teaching at Harvard, which
concentrated on public law subjects like administrative law and public utilities as well as federal jurisdiction, see
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leading the way, the first generation scholars of the late 1920s and 1930s shared strong
commitments to the idea that a powerful national administrative state led by experts was
necessary to solve the most important political issues of the day. These experts would engage in
a “systematic effort” to expand “the area of accredited knowledge as the basis of action” in the
“intricate and technical facts” of a modern economy and society.41 “Regulation by government,”
according to John Dickinson, a former Frankfurter student, would promptly prevent future public
harms caused by the inadequacies, failures, and collapse of the market by granting discretionary
power to government agencies with “technical knowledge” unavailable to courts.42
Ultimately, the emergent approach of first generation administrative law scholarship
emanated from three assumptions. First, federal administrative agencies, with their expertise,
flexibility, and ability to consider systemic solutions to pressing national problems, were so
necessary for a growing, modern nation that traditional constitutional understandings regarding
the separation of governmental powers must yield—at least to some extent.43 Relying on the
same Progressive Era traditions to which Freund and Goodnow subscribed, legal academics
sought to establish a legal environment that enabled government intervention to serve a range of
economic and social reforms.44 Pound had proposed the development of a body of law that

approach to administrative law). Moreover, claiming Frankfurter had secondary status as an administrative law
scholar requires one to ignore the relevance of Frankfurter’s extensive writings on federal jurisdiction and on the
institutional role of the Supreme Court for the development of administrative law as a field. As I note in Part III
below, he certainly did not consider that work irrelevant—procedure and jurisdiction were, to him, central to making
administrative agencies legitimate and protecting the status of the judiciary. In his approach, a proper legal process
was essential to a functional and legitimate administrative process.
41
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(1995).
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would challenge the existing “methods of broad generalization” of constitutionally permissible
action .45 In Frankfurter’s words, the administrative law considered by legal academics must
offer “fluid tendencies and tentative traditions,” and must protect against “sterile generalization
unnourished by the realities of ‘law in action.’”46 Thus only an academic with a “rigorously
scientific temper of mind” who is “able to move freely in the world of social and economic
facts” would be capable of understanding and helping to construct a proper approach to
administrative law.47 Caution about “government by experts” was not entirely misplaced,
Frankfurter wrote, but external political control and internal standards of performance developed
by the expert professionals themselves could provide sufficient restraint.48 The law professor’s
role in the development of modern administrative law, then, was to nurture and promote the
constitutional doctrine necessary to free experts to perform those tasks.
Their second, and equally important, assumption was that notwithstanding the importance
of administrative expertise, a limited judicial review should remain at the center of the process
by which congressional delegations of power to administrative agencies and agency actions
themselves would be deemed legal and legitimate.49 In the opening sentence of a chapter on
“Legal Order in Fields of Disputed Social Policy” in his 1927 book Administrative Justice and
the Supremacy of Law, John Dickinson described the essential but properly constrained role of
the judiciary in this way: “Judicial review for so-called error of law is crucial not only as
keeping open the necessary opportunity for the courts to compel observance of the law as
previously formulated, but also as the channel through which they can carry forward the process

45
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Pound, Growth, supra note 39,at 336.
Felix Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 614, 619 (1927).
Id. at 621.
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See Rabin, Transition, supra note 2, at 122-23.
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of legal development.”50 For Dickinson, review of administrative action by a modern judiciary
open to developing a common law of regulation would constitute “an instrument of the
supremacy of law in building out new ground for the operation of general rules and principles.”51
Frankfurter agreed.52 Constitutional common law, correctly applied by right-minded judges,
would give birth both to a properly modern administrative state and to a properly modern
administrative law jurisprudence. It was not the fault of the common law that some judges
resisted the regulatory modernism preferred by an emerging generation of administrative law
professors; rather, fault lay with those judges who improperly applied legal rules and concepts in
new, inappropriate contexts.53 Indeed, one only need to have considered the success of existing
agencies to see that in a modern administrative law that included judicial review as “an integral
part of the regulatory system,” law’s supremacy was in no danger.54 Maintaining “our traditional
system of judicial justice,” Frankfurter and Landis had argued, was of paramount importance,
and administrative agencies must of course conform to that system.55
Third, first generation administrative law scholars presumed that legal academic research
and teaching should focus on the traditional study of the judicial role in this process—that is, on
the limited judicial review of administrative agencies rather than on the bureaucratic operations
and decisionmaking of the agencies themselves.56 This approach assumed a binary between the
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actual internal work of administrative agencies—which had been at least an element of Freund’s
and Goodnow’s works—and the external law governing judicial review of the jurisdiction and
procedures of the administrative agencies, which within the Frankfurter approach constituted the
57
field of administrative law. Answering the question “what is administrative law?” in a 1937

law review article, Frankfurter’s casebook co-author J. F. Davison rejected the internal approach
as an impossible effort to classify the necessarily intuitive, experimental actions of agencies.58 At
that time there appeared to be no logical universal system of public administration discernible by
law faculties—or, for that matter, even by Justice Holmes, as Davison noted.59 The internal
approach was therefore significantly less appropriate for teaching and research than the external
one, which focused on a typical area of legal academic expertise: the refinement of
constitutional common law principles.

60

These efforts to create a modern conception of

administrative law assumed that courts and legal academics would avoid intervention into the
regulatory process at least for the present until a new administrative court (akin to courts of
equity) would be developed—which itself would not occur until regulatory procedures and
practices had been regularized.61 Meanwhile, law schools across the country began to adopt new
courses in administrative law that studied appellate decisions from federal and state courts of
general jurisdiction using the case method, while the field of “public administration” arose
concurrently in Political Science departments to develop rational and apolitical expertise in
57
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matters of policy and bureaucracy.62 Legal academia’s limited focus on judicial review at once
protected the expertise of lawyers, law professors, and the judiciary within the familiar methods
of teaching and scholarship established in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and
expressed the elite legal academy’s Progressive Era commitment to expertise by presuming that
administrative agencies should be protected from substantive judicial review.63 As one critic of
this approach noted, the curriculum of administrative law classes before (and, only to a slightly
less degree, after) World War II was concerned almost exclusively with appellate judicial
opinions reviewing administrative decisions, with little or no focus on the internal rulemaking or
adjudicatory processes within agencies.64
The focus on external judicial review rather than internal agency operations also shaped
the doctrinal issues upon which first generation scholars focused their attention. Frankfurter’s
co-authored 1932 casebook on administrative law spent more than half its pages on
constitutional challenges to legislation and administrative action, focusing especially on issues
related to the separation of powers and Congressional delegation of powers to agencies.65 This
led one critic to characterize the casebook as “in effect a specialized work on constitutional
law.”66 Freund himself criticized Frankfurter’s exceptional attention to constitutional issues—a
priority reversing that assumed in Freund’s earlier casebook, which had focused almost entirely
upon the statutory and especially common law doctrines that affected agencies—and commented
skeptically upon the status that law teachers and students bestowed upon the fleeting fashion of
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“juristic performance” in the field of constitutional law.67 Later authors abandoned the
Frankfurter casebook’s exceptional concern with constitutional issues, but nevertheless
continued to focus on the judicial review of constitutional issues as a major, preliminary
consideration for a course in administrative law.
C.

68

James Landis and The Administrative Process.

As important as Pound’s, Frankfurter’s, and Dickinson’s work was in the 1920s, James
Landis, author of the seminal work The Administrative Process (1938) as well as Frankfurter’s
student and co-author, was the most important theorist of administrative law in support of the
New Deal.69 Originally delivered at Yale in the prestigious annual Storrs lectures in January
1938 and published as a book that same year, The Administrative Process was at the time the
most coherent, accessible, and comprehensive account of the current state of administrative law
from the perspective of a New Deal proponent.70 Well before his Storrs lectures—which he had
originally been invited to deliver in 1935 but which were delayed while he served as chairman of
the Securities and Exchange Commission—Landis had earned acclaim as a leading New Deal
administrator, and he had recently become dean at Harvard Law School.71
Landis explained that administrative agencies and the administrative legal process that
shaped their work were a necessary outgrowth of the increasingly complex economy and society
that modernity had engendered. As a result of both their historic necessity and their rational
67
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development, “the administrative process” of agency operations and administrative law had
already achieved “great stature” and would only grow in the future.72 Landis considered the
administrative process to be an optimal means of promoting government oversight because
within its parameters agencies could study an issue comprehensively in order to resolve a
controversy as “rightly,” rather than as fairly, as possible.73 Moreover, the regulatory state was
necessary both to distribute wealth to “ethical levels” and to maximize the total of society’s
wealth.74 To those who would complain of the administrative state’s coercive nature in its
efforts to maximize and distribute wealth, Landis asserted that in the state’s absence, economic,
legal, and political coercion would be performed by uncontrollable private entities rather than by
a democratically elected and accountable government.75 Accordingly, Congress and the
President should create more, and more expert, administrative agencies, because only by doing
so could government provide the “efficiency that is the desperate need.”76
In The Administrative Process, Landis dismissed as irrational those opponents of the New
Deal who claimed the Roosevelt administration’s expansion in the number and size of federal
agencies was unconstitutional.77 If a court faced a constitutional claim that legislation or an
agency action violated separation of powers principles, it must recognize the constitutionality
71
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and necessity of both the delegation and the administrative act. Agencies that developed
regulatory programs or adjudicated complaints after following proper procedures should
withstand constitutional scrutiny insofar as the administrative process sufficiently balanced the
constitutional branches of government, and because the products of this process were far more
important to the function of government and the preservation of political order than was the
value of trying to preserve a static, outdated vision of “separate” powers.

78

Thus, the relationship

between agencies and Congress must be formally flexible but based on structural means of
control. Successful statutory delegation would provide agencies with sufficient authority to
devise and implement proper solutions to economic and social problems, while Congress would
retain oversight through the appropriations process.79
Reviewing recent Supreme Court decisions on the constitutionality of the administrative
state with a mixture of respect and criticism, Landis considered the extent to which the Court
shared his vision of agency expertise and the judicial role of validating proper administrative
processes and decisionmaking. Landis praised the Court’s recent decision in Humphrey’s
Executor, which upheld Congressional constraints on the President’s power to remove officers of
80
independent agencies, because the decision demonstrated that the Court was coming to the

mature realization that agencies needed and deserved sufficient “administrative freedom of
movement” through discretion and independence.81 At the same time (and for the same reasons),
Landis decried the Court’s holding that agency findings of “jurisdictional” facts, the existence of
which serve as “a condition precedent to the operation of a statutory scheme,”82 and
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“constitutional facts” “where rights and liberties are involved”83 deserved no judicial deference.84
By creating and enforcing this distinction to protect its institutional prerogative, Landis argued
(referring to Justice Brandeis’s dissents in St. Joseph Stock Yards v. United Statesand Crowell v.
Benson), the Court invited destructive judicial intrusion into the administrative process over legal
matters.85
In this regard, Landis shared legal realists’ faith in expertise and skepticism about
abstract conceptions of constitutional law. Indeed, referencing and utilizing legal realism’s
critique of formalism, he argued that courts must look not just at precedent and legal forms but at
“other sciences” in order to understand the “incredible areas of fact” embedded in every systemic
business problem.86 In facts and science lay the legal necessity and legitimacy for administrative
agencies. The interdisciplinary and flexible expertise necessary to regulate economic behavior
required more than a judiciary of narrow, irrelevant competencies, whose expertise limited them
to the important task of reviewing agency solutions for fairness and reasonableness.87
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Despite his frustration with the Court’s mixed record of respecting the administrative
process and his realist anti-formalism and faith in expertise, Landis nevertheless placed judicial
review at the center of the administrative process. He adopted Justice Brandeis’s declaration in
his dissent in St. Joseph Stock Yards: “‘The supremacy of law demands that there shall be
opportunity to have some court decide whether an erroneous rule of law was applied; and
whether the proceeding in which facts were adjudicated was conducted regularly.’”

88

Courts

offered specific areas of expertise as well as constitutional authority in adjudicating certain types
of disputes between agencies and private parties. Judicial review could and indeed must play an
important role in legitimating agency action that fell within agencies’ broad authority, as well as
in checking unconstitutional congressional delegations to agencies and illegal agency behavior.
He wrote, “The line of demarcation [between facts and law, and agencies and courts] will then
speak in terms of reality, in terms of an appreciation of the limitations and abilities of men, rather
than in terms of political dogma and religious abstractions.”89 The administrative process ends,
then, with judicial review of those issues about which courts have expertise: questions of law and
of procedure. Courts could retain their “supremacy” over issues requiring legal expertise, while
agencies had unreviewable authority to consider those requiring factual expertise, so long as the
agency followed constitutionally and statutorily required procedures—which inevitably produced
the proper application of expert knowledge. Judicial and administrative institutions, employing
their relative competencies, could perform their necessary constitutional and statutory duties.
Operating in this way, law would continue to hold prestige and “grandeur” in a governing
regime with powerful administrative agencies. Closing The Administrative Process, Landis
waxed rhapsodic:
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The power of judicial review under our traditions of government lie with the courts
because of a deep belief that the heritage they hold makes them experts in the synthesis of
design. . . . The rise of the administrative process represented the hope that policies to
shape . . . fields [of social and economic regulation] could most adequately be developed
by men bred to the facts. That hope is still dominant, but its possession bears no threat to
our ideal of the “supremacy of law.” Instead, it lifts it to new heights where the great
judge, like a conductor of a many-tongued symphony, from what would otherwise by
discord, makes known through the voice of many instruments the vision that has been
90
given him of man’s destiny upon this earth.
Hyperbole notwithstanding, The Administrative Process captures the confidence and mood of
first generation scholars towards both administrative agencies and administrative law.
Frankfurter, too, wrote confidently of this emerging consensus of administrative law, which he
asserted constituted “the processes by which great activities of government . . . are subdued by
the reason appropriate to them.”91 The “reason” Frankfurter and Landis advocated was
sufficiently systemic to encompass an enclosed universe of administrative and judicial processes,
with institutions that offered specific competencies and respected the boundaries within which
they operated. But it was also sufficiently open to allow, within those institutional boundaries,
the development of expert agencies capable of solving the problems faced by the modern state,
and careful, wise, and prudent judges capable of resolving legal and constitutional issues only
when necessary and within their courts’ jurisdiction.
II.
Arnold’s Post-Realist Approach to Administrative Law
Like his Harvard-affiliated contemporaries, Arnold was wholly in favor of the New Deal,
whose efforts to bring about what he celebrated as the “great productive machine with new
energy and efficiency” required the expansion of the federal administrative state.92 He explicitly
advocated large-scale governmental interventions into the economy as a necessary response to
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the economic crisis of the Depression. He attributed the crisis to the “industrial feudalism” of
private corporations that had caused widespread unemployment and then failed to respond to the
plight of the legions of destitute people through the country.

93

Thus, responding in 1936 to a

query from The Nation magazine about what he expected of Roosevelt’s second term, Arnold
predicted success for an administration “which attempts, through organizations which it creates
or controls, to step into areas where private enterprise is unable to operate effectively.”94 But that
success would depend, Arnold warned, upon the government’s developing practical, “efficient
organizations”—not high falutin’ “new ideals” or a new “theory of government” about which the
people could not care less.95 In order to facilitate the Roosevelt Administration’s development of
such organizations free from political and legal interference, Arnold focused in his scholarly and
more popular work on ways to limit and channel the judicial review of administrative agencies.
In doing so, he engaged in the same general political and legal project as Frankfurter, Landis,
and their cohorts in the first generation of administrative law scholars.
But Arnold’s approach, which appeared in a law review article and his two mid-1930s
books, was more radical.96 For one thing, his institutional and intellectual affiliations differed
from theirs. He taught at Yale, having turned down a competing offer from Harvard (which he
thought was filled with “colorless” young men97) in favor of the “exciting” times he thought
available to him with the realists in New Haven.98 Furthermore, Frankfurter, Landis, and their
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Harvard-affiliated colleagues were not at the center of realism.99 Once ensconced at Yale and a
close friend and associate of the core group of legal realists, Arnold became the rare realistaffiliated scholar who wrote extensively on administrative law.

100

More significantly, however, Arnold’s approach to administrative law shunned the design
of a properly limited approach to judicial review and the study of the judiciary’s limited
competence. Instead, it was primarily a critical theory of the symbolic practices of governance,
one that rejected a systematic, formal approach to administrative law. At the same time, it was
also an effort to reconstruct a flexible, multifaceted administrative law from available and new
legal doctrines, in hopes of promoting a more efficient and effective state apparatus for
overcoming the crisis of the Depression. In the sections that follow, I provide a concise
summary of Arnold’s post-realist approach before turning to his work on administrative law,
where I consider his critical and reconstructive efforts in turn.
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A.

Arnold’s Post-Realism.

Arnold has been miscast as one of, and/or as an extreme version of, the legal realists that
swept the legal academy during the 1930s.101 Instead, as I have argued elsewhere, Arnold both
extended and broke from realism by considering the implications of realist insights into areas of
public law that mainstream realism had previously neglected and by using new critical
methodologies to develop a singular, idiosyncratic approach to law.102 While the traditional
legal realist critique revealed the historically constructed and contingent nature of the legal forms
that legal formalists essentialized,103 Arnold instead inquired into the deeper importance of the
cultural “symbols” and “folklore” of governance, and especially into the disjunction between the
ideological spirituality of form and what he called the “temporal” needs of society and the
functional means to address them.104 Like the realists generally,105 Arnold’s work featured both
a critical and a reformist mode.106 His critical impulse was generally more prevalent in his
writings, and was and remains the basis for his reputation—although, as I note in Part II-C, his
ideas for a flexible approach to judicial review of administrative agency action was especially
innovative (if not especially detailed and never followed by courts or commentators).
In developing his critical approach, Arnold appropriated—often without clear
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attribution—the insights of the emerging qualitative social sciences of the early twentieth
century. These included liberal psychologists and sociologists performing ideology and
propaganda studies (most prominently Harold Lasswell,107 Vilfredo Pareto,108 and Walter
Lippmann109), anthropologists and folklorists (such as Bronislaw Malinowski110 and Franz
Boas111) studying the folkloric and symbolic practices of “primitive societies,” and institutional
economists (such as Thorstein Veblen112 and Walton Hamilton, Arnold’s colleague at Yale113)
who focused on the social context of economic and social behavior.114 Although his focus was
rarely on developing specific political or economic proposals, Arnold inherited from
institutionalist economics the vision of a structural, mechanistic solution to the endemic
weaknesses and imbalances of capitalism through such devices as government intervention in
setting prices and wages and disciplining corporations.115 Claiming to perform the role of a
“diagnostician” who sought to understand and explain the context and pathologies of the political
debates of the mid- to late-1930s, and, ultimately, to intervene on the side of the New Deal with

106

See Fenster, supra note 12, at 1064-66.
See HAROLD D. LASSWELL, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND POLITICS 183-93 (1930); Lasswell, The Function of
the Propagandist, 38 INT’L J. ETHICS 258 (1928); Lasswell, The Theory of Political Propaganda, 21 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 627 (1927).
108
VILFREDO PARETO, THE MIND AND SOCIETY at v, v-vi (Andrew Bongiorno & Arthur Livingston, trans.,
Arthur Livingston ed., 1935).
109
WALTER LIPPMANN, PUBLIC OPINION 365 (1922).
110
See BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI, CRIME AND CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SOCIETY (1926).
111
See Franz Boas, The History of Anthropology, 20 SCIENCE 512, 519 (1904); Frank Boas, The Mind of
Primitive Man, 14 J. AM. FOLKLORE 1, 2-3 (1901).
112
Veblen’s major works include: THORBEIN VEBLEN, THE VESTED INTERESTS AND THE COMMON MAN 90-93
(Capricorn, 1969) (1919); VEBLEN, THE PLACE OF SCIENCE IN MODERN CIVILISATION AND OTHER ESSAYS, 233
(1919); VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS: AN ECONOMIC STUDY IN THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS
119 (Modern Library 1934) (1898); and Veblen, Why Is Economics Not an Evolutionary Science? 12 Q. J. EC. 373,
388 (1898).
113
Hamilton’s major works include: WALTON H. HAMILTON, INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND INSTITUTIONALISM:
SELECTED ESSAYS (Joseph Dorfman ed., 1974); Hamilton, Institution, in 7 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 84 (Edwin R. A. Seligman ed., 1932); and HAMILTON & HELEN R. WRIGHT, A WAY OF ORDER FOR
BITUMINOUS COAL (1928).
114
See Fenster, supra note 12, at 1078-94.
115
See THEODORE ROSENOF, ECONOMICS IN THE LONG RUN: NEW DEAL THEORISTS AND THEIR LEGACIES,
1931-1993, at 1-11, 65-67 (1997)
107

30

the prevalent intellectual tools of his era,116 Arnold analyzed the conservative political,
economic, and legal formalisms that prevented the emergence of a modern industrial America he
thought would be able to overcome the Depression.117 A diagnosis of what he called “the taboos
and customs of the tribe”—the symptoms of the dominant political culture that structure political
discourse and extend into all of a society’s institutions—was a necessary prerequisite to
developing a properly functional, practical solution to the Depression or to any other crisis or
problem faced by modern society.118 Arnold therefore proposed a shift from realism’s focus on
the mere critique of law’s surface forms and practices, or its temporal inefficiencies, to an
inquiry into the deeper spiritual, symbolic forms and practices that shape law as a field of
governance.
Arnold thus aligned himself with legal formalists and traditional economists (whose work
realists also critiqued) by arguing that certain assumptions regarding legal doctrine, political
structure, and a capitalist economy seemed essential to the governing institutions of the United
States. But he also agreed with legal realists that many of those assumptions were outdated,
inefficient, and unjust. Unlike conventional realists, Arnold had little faith that mere reform
would cure governing institutions and the public of their irrational investments in the symbols of
government and capitalism. Such symbols, he argued, form the terrain upon which the struggle
for political and legal changes takes place. Realists sought to debunk symbols; Arnold sought to
understand and use them to reshape the public’s beliefs in “a science about law rather than a
science of law.”119
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Arnold’s project, then, was to develop a critical method and voice that could best
understand the “symbols of government” and the “folklore of capitalism” as the popular
120

monographs named them.

The result was a provocative, though underdeveloped, approach to

the study of governance that he called “Political Dynamics,”121 as well as an ironic and critical
voice that remains memorable for its ability to deflate the pretentious assumption that legal and
political institutions should somehow uphold consistent, timeless, abstract principles.122 A
reflexive proponent of an excessive functionalism, Arnold sought only those policies and
institutions that he thought could best maximize the welfare of citizens.123 But he did so while
also recognizing the role culture and signification play within institutions and in society and the
popular need to believe in consistent, timeless, abstract symbols. It was this dual approach—a
post-realism that combined realism’s critical functionalism with a social scientific interest in
studying the prevailing culture and ideology of his time—that Arnold brought to the study of
administrative law. I introduce that approach in the sections that follow.
B.

Critiquing the “Symbols” of Administrative Governance.

The final three chapters of Arnold’s first book, The Symbols of Government (1935), apply
the critique of formalism that Arnold had developed in the book’s previous chapters to the
judicial, jurisprudential, and political resistance to the administrative agencies associated with
the New Deal.124 In the grand hierarchy of governing institutions, Arnold lamented, the
administrative tribunal and agency faced a long, largely uphill battle. He contrasted the work of
120
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the tribunal and agency to the work of courts in a criminal trial, a powerful, well-known
spectacle that provides a certain degree of comfort and satisfaction for political subjects in its
procedural format and seemingly impartial application of substantive law. The administrative
tribunal and agency could never compete with this popular conception of the judge and legal
proceedings as upholder of the “Law.” In their operations, administrative agencies simply failed
to provide the necessary symbolic assurance that the underlying philosophical disputes about the
relationship between the State and the individual had been fairly considered and resolved.125
More than any constitutional doctrine or political resistance, this symbolic deficit not only left
agencies vulnerable to political and legal challenges, but rendered them inferior in power and
prestige to the judiciary that would resolve any legal dispute concerning agencies.
Like Frankfurter and Landis, Arnold’s overriding legal focus in Symbols and his second
book, The Folklore of Capitalism (1937), was on the judicial review of administrative agencies.
Arnold was convinced that agencies enjoyed relative advantages in investigating and attacking
the largest economic and social problems of the day. He claimed, for example, that
administrative agencies would enable the country to benefit from their “huge reservoir of
technical skill, capable of running a great productive machine with energy and efficiency.”126 He
rejected the traditional schema that juxtaposed administrative agencies—the looming, demonic
symbols of bureaucracy—against the privileged judiciary—the supposedly neutral institution
with sacred powers to interpret the Constitution and scrutinize legislative and administrative
actions.127 The widespread judicial fetish of an apolitical, objective judiciary, combined with the
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prevailing negative conception of administrative law by conservative members of the bar and
bench, assumed an inherent value in maintaining a strict separation of the tri-partite branches of
government.

128

It was this assumption, Arnold believed, that enabled a formalist, conservative

judiciary to thwart the New Deal’s efforts to promote the production and distribution of the
“comforts” necessary to relieve the Depression.129
The problem, Arnold argued, was symbolic and procedural. Formalism’s legal
distinction between courts and agencies, which in his more conventional realist mode he happily
debunked, was in fact constituted by the prevailing symbolic duality between courts and
agencies. The rule of law and its various institutions and practices, in other words, were the
results of a powerful need for symbols of authority and stability. Law’s symbolic authority
presumes a powerful judiciary that is fair, impartial, and necessarily protective of individual
freedoms, and that is therefore opposed to and above the dangerous “bureaucracy” of
administrative agencies. The judiciary resolves disputes that the bureaucracy creates, and in so
doing demonstrates its inherent superiority in the hierarchy of government and in its abilities to
govern.
Most importantly, courts profit from their position as institutions that merely apply legal
authority, in the form of neutral rules of procedure and substantive common and statutory law
that are external to them. Courts rely upon externally-derived, pre-existing, and arcane rules of
procedure and justiciability that protect them from the intrusion of heated political arguments
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and provide them sufficient discretion to avoid certain disputes at certain times. Accordingly,
even when the results of their decisions are difficult and troubling, courts are never at fault so
long as they follow preconstituted fair procedures and preconstituted substantive law.130 Law’s
“supremacy”—a presumption shared even among proponents of administrative agencies131—
inoculated the judiciary, as an abstract institution, from systemic criticism as well as from
criticism directed at individual justices and judges who obstructed the development of
administrative agencies. Bureaucracies symbolized the inverse. They establish their own
substantive rules and procedures, “that silly form of rule and precedent known as red tape,”
which they apply to their subjects, and therefore appear less objective and legal. Unlike the
judiciary, which appears to be a neutral, apolitical institution that is physically and politically
removed from the disputes it settles, agencies, as part of the Executive Branch, seem directly
connected to the political hurly-burly.132
The judiciary also thrived, Arnold argued, by limiting itself and its exercise of power,
while agencies were required to engage in vast acts of regulatory intrusion in order to achieve
their mandated goals. Although courts gain prestige by appearing to settle disputes while
making the law “more and more certain,” they only actually settle limited issues presented before
them, and thereby “owe their power to the fact that they never clarify total situations.”133 By
refusing to consider the next question that is likely to be brought to them or the implications of
their own decisions, courts reserve their decisional capital and “obtain a power to keep litigants
guessing.”134 Agencies, by contrast, are typically required by statutory mandate to develop
comprehensive regulatory schemes and enforce civil law, and therefore cannot perform their
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duties in so incremental and restrained a manner.135 They therefore appear unduly intrusive,
unwieldy, and bureaucratic, especially when compared to the removed, refined domain of the
judiciary.
The epitome of this symbolic universe was the “trial by combat” model of litigating
challenges to administrative action. In litigating, Article III courts adjudicate challenges to entire
statutory and regulatory regimes through the prism of a dispute between one or more individuals
and the agency and/or federal government. Arnold saw this as a foolishly inefficient and
indeterminate means for evaluating the legality and wisdom of an agency’s actions.136 Courts
decide only individual cases and controversies brought to them by the parties to the suit, even
when such cases represent a small part of a particular regulatory scheme. Courts also require
parties to follow arcane procedural rules; base their decisions solely upon a developed record
produced by the parties themselves; and choose, where necessary, from a limited menu of
remedies.137 In short, cases and the ensuing combat “must just happen” and may require the
expenditure of millions of dollars and extensive delays—an approach that “does not permit a
coherent or planned scheme for judicial participation in government regulation.”138
The appellate decision, the ultimate result of the trial by combat, is singularly unhelpful
for regulatory programs. The Supreme Court’s “delphic pronouncements” in the period leading
up to its declaring the National Recovery Act unconstitutional, for example, often dodged the
crucial constitutional issues the public debated, and even its decision in Schechter Poultry failed
fully to resolve the fate of any of the other acts pending before Congress.139 Nevertheless, the
Court merely added to its own luster by refusing to resolve the constitutional issues it was
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charged with considering:
Here is a government of symbols in its most rarefied essence. The Court had
played its hand with great skill, and emerged triumphant as an institution. The
Constitution was more revered and feared than ever before. But still no one
quite knew just what had happened—what was constitutional, or
unconstitutional.140
Courts thus separate themselves from the regulatory process by remaining “aloof from
investigation and regulation” and awaiting a challenge to a specific “action or threatened action
which has damaged, or is about to damage, some particular person.”141 And by asserting their
authority to decide the constitutionality of regulatory rules developed by an agency’s
investigation, courts could either dodge a controversy or “take pot shots at specific regulations
without being forced to assume responsibility for the regulatory scheme as a whole.”142 Agency
adjudications faced no better fate. To review individual complaints against regulatory
enforcement, agencies such as the National Recovery Administration and the Agricultural
Adjustment Administration developed their own internal administrative processes that
incorporated legal folklore, only to face uncertain appellate review again.143
Even when agencies defeated a challenge to a regulation or an action, they lost the larger
war. In victory, agencies assumed the symbolic role of the bureaucratic victor over an individual
subject to its regulatory power, in a battle whose outcome is determined by the judiciary’s
higher, neutral authority.144 Judicial supremacy, and concomitant administrative inferiority,
emanate from the formalist symbolic hierarchy that privileges the judiciary and law over
agencies and policy. The judiciary gives its blessing upon, and thereby confers temporary
legitimacy to, the agency’s action; but future, more lasting legitimacy will require further
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blessings provided at the conclusion of additional, time consuming, and expensive trials by
combat.
This symbolic structure of administrative law produced the peculiar pathologies of legal
resistance to the New Deal. Formalism’s enduring symbolic construction of courts and
administrative agencies perpetuated the folkloric belief that courts protect individual freedom
while administrative agencies are demonic forces of inefficiency and collectivity, and that courts
represent a “rule of law above men” while administrative tribunals “apply practical
considerations to court decisions.”145 The symbolic assumptions of the formalist approach to
administrative law granted conservative courts—already predisposed to strike down new
regulatory regimes and rules under the false assumption that they were thereby protecting
freedom—too much discretion to reverse agency decisions and the legislative authorization of
regulation. Agencies were therefore relegated to secondary status behind the judiciary,
especially when their specific actions or general legal authority faced a legal challenge. As a
form of dispute resolution and state power, litigation appeared to be an essential and natural
element of nineteenth century laissez faire ideology that remained prevalent in the mid-twentieth
century. As such, litigation provided little more than
a series of miracle plays to give [the individual dispute and its judicial resolution] a
theatrical development. In the memory of the present generation the moral lesson of the
judicial miracle play has been that rugged individuals are not regulated. Instead, they
146
fight for their rights. In this battle they expect government to let them alone.
The emerging field of administrative law practice and the first generation administrative
law scholarship decidedly failed to recognize this symbolic base and conservative bias of
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governance and litigation—in fact, first generation scholars, despite their good intentions, merely
proposed to mire agencies further in the folklore of judicial supremacy and procedure. Arnold
likened efforts to develop a new administrative process, whether by New Deal proponents or
critics, to the “double-headed system of law and equity” that failed to assist dispute resolution
and only led to confusion among courts, attorneys, and laypeople.

147

Because the prevailing

symbolic hierarchy required a clear separation of regulatory agencies and the judiciary, he
speculated, such confusion was likely to persist as academics developed their “dialectic
exploration and footnotes” that would explain the correctness of a new system.148 For Arnold, an
administrative state built around judicial supremacy would not, in the long run, achieve the larger
goal of establishing independent, effective administrative agencies. And so he set out for himself
the task of proposing an alternative means to provide a legal basis and structure for agency
operations.
C.

Arnold’s Administrative Law.

Like Landis and Frankfurter, Arnold saw the work of the administrative lawyer and law
professors as focused on the scope and practice of judicial review. He assumed the necessity and
legitimacy of administrative agencies within the modern state, and wasted little of his time
considering the actual practices and decisions of a particular agency. Accordingly, when Arnold
proposed a notion of administrative law that was distinct from those of either skeptics or
proponents of the administrative state, he did so by rethinking the parameters of judicial review
and the relationship among the three branches of government. In that regard, he was not akin to
Frank Goodnow or Ernst Freund, whose work focused either on internal agency operations or
means to police or expand agency discretion. Moreover, his view departed from that of his
predecessors or contemporaries largely with respect to judicial review of agency rulemaking;
147
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when “lowly and oppressed” individuals sought redress for particularized grievances through an
adjudicatory challenge of a regulation as it applied to them, Arnold conceded that the judiciary
must uphold the fundamental ideal of the fair trial. As he characteristically explained: “In the
celebration of legal and economic theories [when reviewing rulemaking], the Court should be
equipped only with prayer books and collections of familiar quotations. In the protection of
those seeking a fair trial it should be armed with a sword which it dared to use with courage.”
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Regarding the narrow but important legal issues surrounding the judicial review of
administrative rulemaking, however, Arnold offered a radically distinct program than his
contemporaries.
Arnold’s proposed method of judicial review of regulatory administrative actions did not
specifically require courts to uphold all such actions, whether proposed by Roosevelt’s New Deal
or by some other administration or political movement.150 He did, however, assert that a judge
who recognizes “the evanescent nature of any form of social bookkeeping will hesitate to
interfere with any exercise of governmental power which is sincere in its purpose and honestly
designed as an experiment in social welfare.”
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In a clear echo of Holmes, Arnold warned

against a court’s “stand[ing] guard over any legal or economic theory,” lest that theory lose favor
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among scholars and legitimacy among the public.152 Ultimately, Arnold favored judicial
solutions that would enable agencies the opportunity to experiment, that would require courts to
review an agency’s actions almost entirely in light of the interests of society as a whole rather
than in terms of the plaintiff’s interests, that would provide “speedy methods” of appeal to the
U.S. Supreme Court, and that would involve the participation of the judiciary in federal
regulatory regimes.
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In an effort to enable “an orderly, planned participation of courts in the growing area of
governmental regulation,” Arnold proposed a number of solutions to the problems caused by the
prevailing conception of strictly separate powers policed by a powerful judiciary.154 I discuss
these below. Common among each of the methods he suggests was the assumption that
necessary experimentation in the relationship between agencies and courts, and in the work of
agencies, had been unduly checked by the relative hierarchy that granted the judiciary
significantly higher status and power over administrative agencies. Courts could approve or
strike down entire regimes months or even years after the agency had approved them, and
agencies worked in fear that any new rules they proposed would be similarly challenged and
struck down at some indeterminate later date by some as-yet unidentified court under some as155

yet unknown legal theory.

Also common to each of these methods was the assertion that the

lines between branches of government should not simply be redrawn or reconceived as
permeable boundaries. Rather, they should be obliterated, with the judiciary lending its prestige
to agencies by engaging in active but limited oversight in the regulatory process while using its
power and expertise to protect individuals challenging unfair and oppressive agency decisions.
As Arnold explained in a letter to Felix Frankfurter, he thought that “a judiciary which was
152
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permitted to face real problems” would employ “looser and more practical” approaches to the
problem of federal regulation, and would invoke a rhetorical “dialectic” that was “more poetical
156

and symbolic” in upholding and assuming the responsibility for “planned administration.”

Arnold’s proposals ultimately sought to appropriate and display the symbols of governance while
subverting the first generation’s tendencies towards creating logical systems of judicial review.
These proposals remained undeveloped in Arnold’s work, and lack even the appearance
of a system or program. Rather, they are an exercise in anti-formalist guerilla intervention into a
field fast solidifying around a coherent, systematic structure of agency expertise and judicial
review. Despite their larger incoherence, they do sort into three types: those that sought greater
judicial involvement in rulemaking, those that enabled quicker judicial consideration of
challenges to regulatory programs that courts would consider in a relatively non-adversarial
context, and those that proposed greater agency independence from judicial review.
1. Faster Judicial Decisions
Arnold was among those during the mid-1930s who called for federal courts to have the
authority to issue declaratory judgments in constitutional challenges to government action—a
group large enough to be characterized by a law student author in the Harvard Law Review in
1938 as making “[t]he familiar cry for a more speedy adjudication of constitutional issues free
from ‘technical’ barriers.”157 He embraced declaratory judgments, as well as (even more
controversially) advisory opinions, for allowing courts to reach a decision without the formality
of a trial or the risk of remedies that might otherwise attach to constitutionally impermissible
actions.158 Both would give legislators, regulators, and regulated parties the opportunity to know
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whether a statute or set of regulations are constitutionally permissible, and whether private
159

actors’ contemplated courses of conduct would run afoul of statutory and regulatory limits.
Leaving aside the advisory opinion, which Arnold correctly predicted would not be

adopted at the federal level,160 Arnold wrote in the period that the declaratory judgment emerged
as a legitimate judicial remedy for federal causes of action. A decade earlier, even the
Progressive voice of Justice Brandeis had not only pronounced in Willing v. Chicago Auditorium
Association that the declaratory judgment was beyond the power granted statutorily to the federal
judiciary, but noted that the remedy exceeded the justiciability limits of Article III’s “cases and
161

controversies” limitation.

Frankfurter agreed: declaratory judgments were unwise and beyond

the constitutional pale.162 Nevertheless, state legislatures had begun to adopt the declaratory
judgment in the early twentieth century,163 and five years after Brandeis’s decision in Willing the
Court held that a suit originally brought in state court under the state’s declaratory judgment act
could present a justiciable appeal to the Supreme Court, “so long as the case retains the essentials
of an adversary proceeding, involving a real, not a hypothetical controversy, which is finally
determined by the judgment below.”

164

At least in part as a result of the Court’s changed
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perspective, Congress passed the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act,165 which the Court
166

unanimously upheld against a constitutional challenge in 1937.

Soon thereafter, declaratory

judgments became a central remedy within administrative law. The original Administrative
Procedure Act, passed in 1946, expressly permitted any person “adversely affected or aggrieved”
by Agency action to seek “Judicial Review” thereof by “actions for declaratory judgments,”167
while courts, commentators, and the Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure
praised the declaratory judgment as a remedy capable of solving disputes over administrative
action.168
But Arnold wanted more from the remedy, and in the mid-1930s criticized its impending
domestication. He was convinced that declaratory judgments, like advisory opinions, were
unlikely to emerge as a new way of testing and reviewing regulations because they would throw
the Court into a political maelstrom that it sought to avoid in order to protect its “aloof and
strategic position, and thereby its priestly power.”169 The narrow vision of declaratory judgments
in state legislatures (and, by implication, in the Supreme Court’s requirements of appeals from
state courts) blunted the remedy’s radical potential by merely reproducing the old case and
controversy requirement in a new form. “The very fact that it has surrounded itself with such an
enormous body of learned literature, philosophy, and cases during the brief period of its
acceptance,” Arnold complained ironically, “indicates that the framers of [declaratory judgment
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acts] have been anxious not to depart from the traditions of the past.”170 And indeed, the federal
act limited declaratory judgments to “cases of actual controversy,”

171

a limitation that the Court

cited as essential to the Act’s constitutionality by establishing a remedy and procedure resulting
from “an adjudication of present right upon established facts” rather than “an advisory opinion
upon a hypothetical basis.”172 Decrying the excessively technical requirements of the federal
declaratory judgment as it was understood and promoted by his Yale colleague Edwin Borchard,
Arnold ultimately envisioned the remedy as a post hoc advisory opinion in which constitutional
challenges to statutes and regulations could be adjudicated quickly, and courts could not avoid
“inconvenient cases” through excessive “‘judicial’ thinking” that forced the presentation of cases
173

in particular ways at a particular stage of development.

He also advocated, but was equally ambivalent about, the use of injunctions as a remedy
for challenges to New Deal legislation.174 Injunctions promised speedy resolution of issues at a
preliminary stage as well as the possibility of ongoing jurisdiction and judicial oversight in
administering the remedy. On the one hand, a request for injunctive relief allowed courts a
certain degree of discretion in awarding and crafting a remedy while they still worked within the
conventional framework of the trial by combat. But the use of injunction was significantly less
than perfect precisely because the legal standard for its issuance was too indeterminate. Within
the trial by combat framework, courts could use the undefined irreparable harm standard to delay
or strike down regulatory programs permanently, while a temporary injunction’s cost and
uncertainty might result in a de facto permanent end to an agency’s efforts.
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Moreover, the

requirement that a plaintiff seeking to enjoin enforcement of a statute or regulation first violate it
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created an undue hazard for potential plaintiffs who feared having to face penalties if they failed
176

to win.

The litigation by case or controversy model, even when applied in the early and

relatively speedy context of a preliminary injunction hearing, required unnecessary acts and
considerations in order to obtain a resolution of the constitutional issue with which the interested
parties were concerned.
2. Greater Judicial Involvement
Accordingly, Arnold considered options that abandoned the traditional litigation model.
His proposals included not only excluding judicial review entirely, which I discuss in the next
section, but, paradoxically, efforts to increase judicial involvement by including courts in the
rulemaking process itself. The notion that courts and agencies should operate together as agency
partners, rather than as separate, often adversarial, elements within a system of government, was
not entirely new.177 Nor was the notion of partnership or collaboration foreign to administrative
law scholars and advocates of the administrative state, including Justice Frankfurter himself.178
But Arnold’s efforts, predictably, were intended to push courts more emphatically and
structurally into partnership with agencies. The most radical of these efforts would have courts
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treat agencies’ regulatory schemes “as they d[o] [the courts’] own masters, referees, or receivers
. . . [u]nder a scheme of discretionary review.”

179

Courts could thereby “approve or disapprove

administrative regulations as they were formulated” and would therefore be responsible for
“definite rules.”180 As a result, the judiciary engaged in administrative law would serve as “an
investigating body” rather than “an arbiter of combats.”181 Such supervisory review would
prevent the judiciary from invalidating agencies’ necessary experimentation with new rules and
administration. Courts would presumably be privy to the information and insights of experts
without the cumbersome procedures of civil litigation, and would experience as well the
difficulties and frustrations of formulating a regulatory response to a complex set of economic
and social issues. The administrative and judicial processes would thereby collapse or at least
proceed simultaneously. Agencies would operate as junior partners to courts in a partnership
whose purpose was to develop regulatory programs. As a result, agencies would no longer
perceive courts as adversarial authorities whose review begins only after the agency has fully
182

developed its programs.

Although it would soon be codified in Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
judicial use of a special master was a longstanding tradition in courts of equity,183 and the new
rule largely adopted existing doctrine and practice.184 The court-appointed master and receiver
models offered for Arnold an apparatus by which courts could, at their discretion, appoint and
adopt an objective adjunct to supervise, investigate, and come up with proposed resolutions to a
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particular matter.185 For similar reasons, Arnold identified the corporate reorganization, where
federal courts relied upon receivers, committees, and masters to oversee, as another potential
model for agency-court partnership.

186

In the optimal equity receivership process that emerged

by common law innovation, federal district courts oversaw a process by which the debtor and all
its creditors and bondholders would negotiate a plan to enable the bankrupt corporation to get
back on its feet financially.187 At the time Arnold was drawing this analogy, in the mid-1930s,
his friend and Yale colleague William Douglas was helping to lead efforts to reform federal
bankruptcy law in part by rationalizing receivership procedures through new federal statutes and,
ultimately, by increasing federal oversight of the bankruptcy process through Securities and
Exchange Commission investigations of large corporate reorganizations.188 For Arnold, the
reorganization process’s openness, collaboration, and relatively active judicial involvement
seemed to offer flexibility that was lacking in classic adversarial litigation.189
Arnold also wanted to develop a means by which courts could retain ongoing jurisdiction
over regulatory programs. He applauded the Supreme Court’s decision in Appalachian Coals,
Inc. v. United States, for example, where the Court affirmed a lower court’s “holding a suit open
for purpose of experimental development” to see if an otherwise per se illegal combination of
coal producers could nevertheless act in a reasonable manner to save the coal industry in
Appalachia.190 Although it reversed the lower court’s ruling finding that a combination of coal
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operators had violated federal antitrust laws, the Court remanded the case with instruction that
the lower court may retain jurisdiction for the purpose of taking remedial measures in the event
that the defendants’ future operations prove to be illegal and against the public interest.

191

Ongoing jurisdiction and oversight would again transform courts into partners with agencies in
the latter’s regulatory programs.
3. Minimize Judicial Involvement
Arnold also sought means to enable agencies to bypass, or at least minimize, judicial
oversight. To that end, he favored the consent decree, which he would later utilize extensively as
head of the antitrust division of the Justice Department from 1938 to 1943.192 Since the mid1920s, the Justice Department had increasingly resolved civil suits enforcing antitrust laws
against anti-competitive business activities through consent decrees in which defendants agreed
to prospective injunctions against future illegal activity.193 An equitable means to end
enforcement actions through tailored injunctions negotiated by the government and defendants,
the government’s authority to enter into and hold parties to the terms of consent decrees had been
upheld by the Supreme Court in two decisions in the years immediately preceding Arnold’s work
on administrative law.

194

In Swift II, its second consent decree decision, the Court also limited

the ability of courts to modify existing decrees to “[n]othing less than a clear showing of
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grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions.”195 To Arnold, the consent decree
offered federal agencies welcome discretion in regulatory and legal enforcement with limited
judicial oversight in its crafting and without cumbersome, fixed rules of judicial review.

196

In the

words of commentators writing contemporaneously with Arnold, the consent decree represented
“law enforcement by negotiation,” enabling the parties to use this negotiation to “settle[]
economic questions of great public importance” without the direct intervention of potentially
197

conservative courts and the trial by combat mode of judicial dispute resolution.

In a proposal that would have avoided judicial review altogether, Arnold suggested that
agencies use arbitration with regulated parties to “escape . . . the judicial hunt for issues” by
settling disputes over the constitutionality of legislation and agency action.

198

Of course,

advocating arbitration to settle disputes over matters of law—and especially of constitutional
law—merely begs the question of whether and to what extent a party to arbitration could seek
judicial review of the resulting decision or agreement. Arnold did not propose an answer, but did
respond to the controversy of judicial review of arbitrated settlements in his typical fashion by
noting with bemused irony the unquestioned presumption that a nonjudicial resolution was
inherently less fair and authoritative than a judicial one.199 For Arnold, the increasingly
widespread use of arbitration as an “escape from law” made plain the unsettling fact that the
“judicial system has been unable to include the settlement of many important types of
disputes.”200 Dispute resolution, in other words, was more important to Arnold than the
resolution of broad legal issues. But arbitration was imperfect, Arnold conceded, not least
195
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because arbitration agreements to settle disputes had “become technical and full of pitfalls,” and
thereby defeated the purpose of avoiding the symbolic jurisprudential constraints that led him to
seek refuge in arbitration as an alternative model.

201

Atthe same time, at least arbitration offered

a model for moving parties towards a reasonably agreeable resolution outside the folkloric realm
of the trial by combat, with its initial uncertainty, its absolute winners and losers, and its
presumption of judicial superiority.
D.

Conclusion.

Reform was inevitable, Arnold speculated, although not immediate; he believed that an
imminent groundswell of popular belief in planning and a concomitant abandonment of laissez
faire as an economic ideal would surely drive courts to “intelligent procedural planning.”

202

Such

reform was not likely to sweep away the old symbols.203 But the “practical elasticity” and
relative indeterminacy of those symbols would allow for the emergence of a new, more efficient
relationship between courts and agencies, while the traditional symbols of judicial review would
survive to meet the “pontifical needs” and “deeply felt emotional want” of lawyers and the
general public.204 The emergent New Deal and the residual formalist folklore, in other words,
would by necessity coexist.
Although he recognized the importance of an independent judiciary as a symbol of
governance, Arnold happily and creatively considered any functional solution that would more
efficiently enable agencies to work what he believed to be their instrumental magic. He
eschewed both a case-driven focus on the federal appellate adjudication of constitutional issues
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by common law development and the creation of a new-fangled approach to administrative law
based on a comprehensive federal statute and a federal administrative court. Instead, consistent
with his general approach to legal thinking and pedagogy, he embraced an oddly inventive
method of creating new means to avoid the trial by combat in pragmatic ways. In the preface to
his casebook on trials, judgments, and appeals, co-authored with his Yale colleague Fleming
James, Arnold declared:
[F]rom the point of view of this book, legal principles are regarded as an argumentative
technique—in other words, as an arsenal of offensive and defensive weapons to be used
in litigation. . . . Inventiveness and ingenuity in the use of legal analogies are actually far
more important in legal battles than scholarly learning.205
And so it was with his vision of the “principles” of administrative law. Arnold’s conception of
administrative law and government regulation, as well as his tenure as head of the Antitrust
Division, demonstrates a strong push for structural change that, through the strategic deployment
of using existing symbols and laws, would not appear as radical as it was.

206

In his willingness to

see through and abandon entirely the contingent, constructed symbols of judicial supremacy, as
well as the constitutional monolith requiring the separation of government’s tri-partite branches,
and in his eagerness to attack them offensively and defensively with both shopworn and newly
formed weapons, Arnold stood alone.
III.
The “Mumbo-Jumbo of Legal Jargon”: Frankfurter, Arnold,
and the Procedural Core of Administrative Law
Arnold’s lonely, outlying stance and kit bag approach to administrative law opposed the
emerging consensus building around notions of relative institutional competencies and of judicial
review as a limited, but important, safeguard for the modern liberal democracy. As a prominent
legal academic, he and his proposals did not go unnoticed. In correspondence with Arnold and
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in the public forum of his casebook on federal jurisdiction, Felix Frankfurter summarily rejected
Arnold’s vision of a more active judiciary engaged alongside administrative agencies in the
regulatory state. In so doing, Frankfurter and his co-authors clarified a vision of a judicial
process that should be separate from, that should follow on, and that ultimately should structure
and trump the administrative process in which he and Landis had so much faith. This Part uses
Frankfurter’s comments and work to identify the differences between the vision of administrative
law developed by first generation scholars and Arnold’s criticism and alternative approach. The
contrast foregrounds the procedural core of administrative law by revealing what Frankfurter and
Arnold saw as the stakes of the first generation’s project. For Arnold, the logical system of
administrative law stood in the way of the administrative state; for Frankfurter, administrative
law provided the procedural protection that would enable both an administrative state and a
stable, powerful judiciary.
Arnold was friends with both Frankfurter and Landis from at least his early days at
Yale.

207

The elder Frankfurter read his work and on occasion sent him comments. After reading

“Trial by Combat and the New Deal,” in which Arnold developed his approach to administrative
law, Frankfurter praised its “frolicsome learning” and “liveliness of spirits.”208 But he ultimately
rejected Arnold’s approach and satirized his refusal to distinguish “‘right’ or ‘wrong,’” and took
sardonic umbrage at what he saw as Arnold’s call for a “new deal by the judiciary, with its
slogan ‘government of the people, for the people and by the courts.’”209 He derided Arnold’s
proposed “juristic offensive” as a secret plot to “arouse popular revulsion and thus lead to the
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appropriate confinement of judicial power.”210 Whether Arnold secretly hoped courts would
actively oversee administrative regulation so that their failure would destroy judicial authority
and status—which is the implication of Frankfurter’s criticism—is unclear. Perhaps, as
Frankfurter suggested, Arnold was covertly trying to achieve what he had argued two years
earlier in a major article in the Harvard Law Review: that procedure can serve as “an escape
211

from substantive law” when the relevant legal rules seem opposed to reaching a desired result.
At minimum, Frankfurter clearly considered Arnold’s ideas a bizarre effort to extend
administrative law beyond constitutional limits.
In a 1928 monograph that he wrote with Landis, Frankfurter had begun to articulate a

Progressive theory of the judiciary, imagining it as an institution with coherent and well-defined
authority operating in a modern nation-state in which jurisdiction and procedure were themselves
instruments of ends, or “means of effectuating policy.”212 And later, in an article written with
Henry Hart, he advocated judicial resistance to the “undue suction into the avoidable polemic of
politics” that arose from considering any and all constitutional challenges to the administrative
process.
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In that article, published the same year as Arnold’s “Trial by Combat,” Frankfurter

and Hart thoroughly embraced the “seemingly technical rules” of jurisdiction as both a form of
“wise statecraft” and as a set of “procedural safeguards” intended to protect the judiciary from
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“subtle or daring attempts at procedural blockade-running.”214 Federal courts generally, and the
Supreme Court specifically, must be strict regarding jurisdiction in constitutional cases to utilize
the “accumulated experience” that has formed “the tradition of constitutional adjudication.”

215

Proceeding in what Frankfurter and Hart declared was the traditional manner allowed the justices
to appear as “statesmen,” and, most importantly, enabled “continuance of the Court’s traditional
share in the government of our democratic society.”216 If it proceeded otherwise, the Court would
affirmatively create or assert itself in inter-branch disputes in a way that could threaten its hardwon prestige.217 In his 1938 review of the Court’s decision to find jurisdiction to review
Congressional actions in cases challenging the constitutionality of the Tennessee Valley
218

Authority

and the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act,219 Frankfurter found instances in

which—whether one agreed with the Court’s ultimate decision to uphold or strike down these
two representative legislative schemes of the New Deal—the Court’s very grant of jurisdiction
demonstrated that it had foolishly fallen prey to the “imponderable pressure of the public
importance of the statutes under review.”220 If the doctrine of constitutional review that
cautioned against bowing to such pressure were further unsettled, Frankfurter cautioned,
“unnecessary friction [would be added] to the complicated workings of our government; it
weakens the responsibility of Congress in shaping policy; it undermines vital confidence in the
disinterested continuity of the judicial process.”221
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In his casebook on federal jurisdiction (written with Harry Shulman), Frankfurter pitted
his and Hart’s argument about the necessity of federal jurisdiction’s role as a bulwark against the
judiciary’s involvement in substantive matters against Arnold’s efforts to use procedure to force
222

courts to reach substantive efforts.

Consecutive excerpts within the opening chapter on the

constitutional limits on federal jurisdiction and procedure reveal the crux of these opposing
views. For Frankfurter and Hart, jurisdictional limitations, and most notably the case or
controversy requirement, reflect the “accumulated experience of a century and a half” of
constitutional adjudication.223 Arnold saw no need for a case or controversy requirement at all,
and considered it mere priestly ideology that limited dispute resolution to small, narrow issues
argued by exaggeration and partisanship.

224

A rigid case or controversy requirement was hardly

a forward-thinking doctrine to encourage development of administrative operations necessary to
the modern state. “The common law,” he argued, “is neither clear, sound, nor even capable of
being restated in areas where the results of cases are being most bitterly contested. And
particularly with reference to administrative regulation does mutual exaggeration of opposing
claims negative the whole theory of rational, scientific investigation.”225 To Frankfurter and
Hart, this was foolish and silly:
It is neither intellectual timidity nor adherence to the mumbo-jumbo of legal
jargon that has made the Supreme Court from the very outset, on appeals to it,
give very restricted scope to the concept of “case” or “controversy.” The instinct
of statesmen who were either participants in or witnesses to the fashioning of the
Constitution decisively rejected any practice which would make of the Court a
standing body of expert expounders of the Constitution. If the Court was to have
the vital function which it evolved for itself, the occasions for its authoritative
226
intervention had to be severely circumscribed.
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When courts utilize the restraint and discretion offered by jurisdictional limitations, Frankfurter
and Hart claimed, they engage in a reasoned effort to preserve the institutional competence of the
judiciary.
Theirs was the most sophisticated vision of judicial restraint of any first generation
administrative law scholars. They assumed that proper, constitutionally-limited legal process at
once sufficiently constrained the administrative process and allowed that process to develop
expert policy. For Arnold, a judiciary restrained by a limited vision of its constitutional duty and
authority unduly delayed the implementation of necessary federal regulation, provided courts
with political cover from difficult decisions, and delegitimated agencies relative to courts by
simultaneously claiming authority to pass constitutional judgment over agency action and
refusing to do so in a particular instance (while reserving the privilege to do so later). For first
generation administrative law scholars, the judicial process was an entity apart from and superior
to the administrative process; for Arnold, judicial and administrative processes were secondary
to, and themselves merely part of, the regulatory project of New Deal governance. One
advocated a timeless, presumptively nonideological constitutional system without any necessary
substantive end; the other championed a contingent, historically necessary and appropriate
regulatory project that sought to respond to an economic and political crisis.
A series of friendly exchanges between Frankfurter and Arnold in early 1936 that began
in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Butler (1936) crystallized these
opposing changes.
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The Court in Butler held that the processing tax at the core of the

Agriculture Adjustment Act of 1933 was an unconstitutional invasion of the reserved powers of
the states and exceeded Congress’s taxing and spending authority under the general welfare
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clause.228 In his majority opinion, Justice Roberts declared that the “only” duty of the judicial
branch when faced with an “appropriately challenged” act of Congress is “to lay the article of the
Constitution which is invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to decide whether the
latter squares with the former.”

229

For Justice Stone, joined by Justices Brandeis and Cardozo in

dissent, the majority’s willingness to strike down a key portion of the Act in its entirety, in
response to a suit by the receiver of an agriculture commodity processing company that owed
taxes from previous years, ignored an essential “guiding principle” of constitutional adjudication:
necessary and prudent judicial self-restraint in the face of efforts to seek constitutional
invalidation of seemingly “unwise laws” should properly defer the power of repeal to “the
ballot” and “the processes of democratic government.”

230

Similarly, Walter Gellhorn, in his 1940

casebook, would characterize Justice Roberts’s statement and approach to adjudication as one
“made by the learned justice more for the delectation of the newspaper reading public than for
the enlightenment of the profession,” and as akin to support for the issuance of advisory
opinions.231
As a supporter of the New Deal, Arnold was opposed to the substance of the Court’s
decision.232 But the majority’s willingness to consider the constitutionality of the entire statute
was consistent with his desire for speedy and dramatic adjudication. Tongue firmly in cheek,
Arnold wrote Frankfurter two days after the decision was issued, saying that he “never dreamed”
he would have such influence on the Court, and that he knew of no source other than his article
“where the Court could find authority for making such a broad decision.”233 Frankfurter agreed,
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returning Arnold’s letter with a handwritten note characterizing him as a “prophet.”234 Three
months later, after the Court issued its Carter Coal decision invalidating the Bituminous Coal
Conservation Act of 1935 as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to fix hours and
wages to certain coal producers and miners,

235

Frankfurter sent Arnold a mocking telegram in

which he complained that the decision
convinces me that my devotion to ancient Supreme Court doctrine that the [] Court
should confine itself to the case in the record is completely outmoded and should be
abandoned by sound men everywhere. Stop. You were right. Stop. I was wrong. Stop.
And so [I] apply herewith for membership in your seminar where these inevitable judicial
tendencies to spread opinions all over the map are explained with the aid of your almost
uncanny penetration into judicial psychology. Stop. I am now a convert to your
statesmenlike doctrine of contracting jurisprudence by enlarging it which is probably the
236
best substitute that can be adopted for sociological jurisprudence in these curious times.
Arnold apparently hoped that the Court’s occasional striking down New Deal legislation
might establish a new, dramatic jurisprudential approach, that—no matter the substantive
result—would be incidentally beneficial to legislators and agencies by speeding the validation of
regulatory programs. Frankfurter saw this and was appalled at the potential danger to the Court’s
institutional prestige, even if the Court’s invalidation of key parts of the New Deal might lead to
a political and popular upheaval in support of New Deal programs that the Court could not
contain. At minimum, Arnold embraced the long-term regulatory gains that would result from
removing the uncertainty of piecemeal litigation, and he may even have enjoyed seeing, as
Frankfurter suspected, the prospect of an administration he favored facing a wounded Court. His
was, in the end, a strategic litigator’s vision of administrative law that sought to utilize existing
procedure to achieve a particular substantive result. While Frankfurter supported the same
substantive aspects of the New Deal, his attachment to a philosophical, normative, and systemic
vision of legal process outweighed his politics.
234
235

Felix Frankfurter, undated annotations to Letter re: Butler, supra note 227.
Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 238.

59

IV.
The Administrative Process and the Legal Process Approach
The legal process Frankfurter and the first generation of administrative law scholars
triumphed as a corollary to the administrative process foreshadowed the emergence, after World
War II, of what became known as the legal process approach. When they framed the proposed
field of administrative law doctrine, research, and teaching as a matter of institutional design
within a seamless system of law and governance, first generation scholars had laid groundwork
for the intellectual ferment that followed.237 Frankfurter’s student and co-author, Henry Hart,
would become one of the leading proponents of the legal process approach, as would many of
Frankfurter’s other students at Harvard and Supreme Court clerks.238 Legal process came to
dominate legal education in the post-war period; and today it remains a pervasive, if not quite
predominant, characterization of governance and especially of the judiciary’s role within it.239 As
it further developed the ideas of first generation administrative law scholars, the legal process
approach came to shape the entirety of American post-war public law scholarship, providing
both a legitimating set of procedural norms and practices for the growing administrative state and
a flexible approach to the varied and changing purposes for which federal agencies would be
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used.240 This Part draws connections between the scholarship of pre-war administrative law
theory and the post-war legal process approach, and argues that by both criticizing the
emergence of a formal, systematic vision of administrative law and proposing a quite different
set of relationships between courts and agencies, Arnold forecast the triumph of a processcentered approach, and saw in advance that approach’s functional, conceptual, and political
limits.
A.

The Institutional Core of the Legal Process Approach.

Because first generation administrative law scholarship had focused on designing a
system of judicial review that would enable the emergence of an optimal administrative process,
241

they did not anticipate the entirety of the legal process paradigm.

Briefly identifying the

elements of the legal process approach, however, makes plain the historical connection between
the two. The legal process approach commanded that judges should rely on “reasoned
elaboration” expressed in fulsome, consistent, and rational decisions;242 engage in a “maturing of
collective thought” through the careful, incremental exercise of common law development;243 and
ultimately create and protect a self-limiting judicial institution that performs those tasks in which
it is competent.244
This latter assertion about institutional competence demonstrates the essential continuity
between first generation administrative law scholarship and contemporary administrative law
theory. It rests on a presumption about the structural determination of governance, and states a
commitment, both as a matter of theory and a matter of normative consequence, to a permanent
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allocation of decisionmaking within specific and appropriate institutions.245 In an article on
criminal law, Henry Hart declared that institutional competence is “axiomatic,” insisting that
“each agency of decision ought to make those decisions which its position in the institutional
structure best fits it to make.”

246

Settled institutional structures are “more fundamental than the

substantive arrangements in the structure of a society,” Hart wrote with his co-author Albert
Sacks, because they distribute decisionmaking among institutions, from the private ordering of
the market to the interconnected institutions of government, and thereby serve as “the source of
the substantive arrangements and the indispensable means of making them work more
effectively.”

247

The primary purpose of law’s core “constitutive or procedural understandings or

arrangements” is to respect and protect institutional structures, which legal process adherents
considered more fundamental than mere substantive arrangements because they—and only
they—enable “well-informed and wise decisions” and optimal results.248
Thus, the legal process approach presumes the basic functionality of American
representative democracy, and conceptualizes judicial review both as an “anomaly” that is duly
constrained by attention to process issues and as the most effective and least dangerous bulwark
to other institutions’ failure to operate within the bounds of constitutional order.

245
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the legal process approach operates less as a full-blown jurisprudential theory than, in Neil
Duxbury’s words, “an attitude premissed on the belief that those who respect and exercise the
faculty of reason will be rewarded with the discovery of a priori criteria which give sense and
250

legitimacy to their legal activities.”

Committed to a rather windy-seeming claims about the

reason embedded in and produced by procedural formality, the legal process approach seems to
stand in opposition to the overt anti-formalism of legal realism. But it has appropriated many of
realism’s tendencies and insights, including its focus on procedure and its recognition that the
judiciary is an active agent of decisionmaking, an agency whose decisions make law rather than
251

finding it.

In doing so, however, it articulates realism’s lessons in distinct ways by focusing on

systemic, rather than functional, ends. Legal process adherents study procedure to develop and
protect the judiciary’s institutional competence as appellate tribunals built upon reason, rather
than to create detailed, functional procedural regimes.252 Like realists, legal process adherents
diverge from the scientific naturalism of classical legal formalism. Despite this commonality,
however, legal process ultimately proposes a strict set of distinctions—between law and policy;
between branches of government; and between principled reason and unprincipled, willful
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activism—that themselves constitute what Morton Horwitz has called an “institutional
formalism.”

253

The legal process approach’s institutional core and concern with structure echoes similar
tendencies in first generation administrative law theory. To make this connection even clearer,
consider the relatively brief treatment that Henry Hart and Albert Sacks gave in their famous
casebook materials254 to the place of administrative agencies within the legal process.255 They
presumed a settled system in which, despite the “great variety” of administrative powers, “the
dynamics of subsequent growth” in the “arrangement” of administrative regulation “follow a
distinctive pattern.”256 Official responsibility for formulating policy, elaborating statutory
authority, and developing methods of individual adjudication lies first in the administrative
agency to which regulatory authority was generally delegated, no matter whether the legislation
bestowed these specific powers on the agency or was silent.257 Its “first-line status” grants the
agency the opportunity, without judicial assistance, to establish regulatory programs and
adjudicatory arrangements on which regulated parties can rely, and to spare courts the burden of
handling “the great mass of controversies” itself.

258

“On appropriate challenge” to agency action

or the underlying legislation itself, courts function as a “second-line” reviewing agency with the
duty to determine the constitutionality of the statute and regulatory program, and whether the
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agency action was authorized by the statute.259 Viewed from the perspective of first generation
administrative law scholars, legal process theory’s commitment to institutions and structures
would appear quite familiar; and looking backward at the historical and thematic connections
between the two, we can see more clearly the procedural core of early modern administrative
law, with its pretensions of structural protection for the agencies and the more permanent and
important judicial institutions.
B.

Against Theology: Arnold, Henry Hart, and Judicial Process.

In 1960, at the legal process approach’s apogee, Thurman Arnold published a scathing
attack on Henry Hart in the Harvard Law Review, responding to Hart’s criticism of what he
deemed unreasoned and unprofessional opinions issued by certain members of the Warren
260

Court.

Using a fairly simple empirical method, Hart had complained that the Court was

deciding too many cases too quickly,261 and as a result was issuing decisions that lacked “the
underpinning of principle which is necessary to illumine large areas of the law and thus
discharge the function which has to be discharged by the highest judicial tribunal of a nation
dedicated to exemplifying the rule of law.”

262

To prove his point, Hart provided a detailed

exegesis of the Court’s recent grant of habeas corpus in Irvin v. Dodd,263 a decision in which the
Court provided a “transparently indefensible reading [of the Indiana Supreme Court opinion
denying the capital defendant’s appeal of his conviction due to a biased jury and improper
prosecutorial conduct] in order to strike down jurisdictional barriers to the consideration of
federal claims.”264 In this decision, and generally, the Court had failed to follow the proper legal
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process that would “illumine large areas of the law” and establish “impersonal and durable
principles of constitutional law.”

265

Hart closed his jeremiad by warning that reason, and not

merely a temporary majority of justices, is “the life of law,” and by claiming that such reason
had been lost in the operations of the Warren Court.266
Arnold had left Yale and academia in 1938 for the Justice Department, and had since
served briefly on the District of Columbia federal circuit court of appeals before establishing the
private law firm that would become Arnold & Porter,267 but he felt strongly enough about his old
nemesis’s criticism to defend in print a Court that included many of his own friends.268 After
disagreeing with Hart’s close reading,

269

Arnold dismissed his larger argument that the Court’s

purportedly incompetent decisions failed to uphold the institution’s standard. In the same critical
voice he had wielded decades before, he argued that principles were not immutable, and that the
operations of the Supreme Court, with its nine diverse members, often resulted in difficult
decisions with fragile majorities—unlike the opinions of legal academics who Arnold believed
used the limitless time available to them to propose platitudes and unworkable legal propositions
in the Harvard Law Review.270 What is worse, Arnold alleged, Hart’s conception of the proper
judicial process and the competent judicial institution had evolved into a new conservative
formalism in which he and his cohorts criticized the Court on procedural and formal grounds in
order to condemn the Court’s increasingly liberal tendencies.271
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Here, in a somewhat changed but still recognizable form, was the complaint Arnold had
lodged against Hart and his colleagues more than twenty years earlier—although he saw the
Henry Hart of 1960 opponents as an unsympathetic associate of the conservative “corporate bar”
rather than as a fellow New Deal advocate.

272

Hart’s legal process approach, it seemed, had

confirmed Arnold’s original suspicion that underneath the apparent New Deal advocacy of first
generation administrative law scholars lurked a formalism as pernicious as that of Langdellian
conservatives. For Arnold in 1960 as in the mid-1930s, the fetish of process, institutions, and
systems came at the expense of a frank consideration of substance. Systems would not aid
political efforts to improve the economy and society, any more than they had aided the New
Deal; and the wider social benefits that would flow from these political movements, Arnold
presumed, vastly outweighed any loss that would be incurred by an “unprincipled” Court or a
non-systematic administrative law. Law’s role was to further substantive aims, not to build and
protect “reason” through procedural and institutional systems. Arnold thereby anticipated
arguments that critics from fields as diverse as Law and Economics and Critical Legal Studies
would later employ against the legal process approach.
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included, for Henry Hart, counting the hours and minutes justices spent on each decision to see if
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building of a post-war, post-realist consensus around a particular vision of law and reason. In
terms of influencing legal doctrine and future scholarship, whether in the field of administrative
law or in legal doctrines and legal academia generally, Arnold lost that debate badly. But, as the
next Part argues, aspects of his critique continue both to resonate in contemporary scholarship
and to explain the idiosyncratic dynamics of administrative law.

V.
Regulatory Frustration and the Recurring Crisis of the “Logical System”
The approach offered by first generation administrative law scholars and challenged by
Arnold successfully established a long-lasting conceptual system to understand the role of law
and legal institutions in the administrative state. Its concerns with administrative discretion and
judicial review continue to structure and suffuse the curriculum of administrative law courses
and remain at the core of administrative law scholarship. At the same time, the field regularly
suffers through periods of crisis and self-examination, due in part to external political pressures
placed on administrative agencies and their regulatory practices and to the insights of
interdisciplinary scholarship that test some of administrative law’s foundations. This Part
suggests that most legal academic challenges to the legitimacy and regulatory practices of
administrative agencies and to the way in which the subject is studied and taught arise from
within the dynamic of institutional competence and judicial review that was found and furthered
by first generation scholars. Moreover, the frustration that these challenges represent is often
resolved—to the extent that it is resolved at all—within the same dynamic. To challenge the
dynamic itself—as some recent scholarship is doing—is to return, in a sense, to Arnold’s project:
resist or disrupt the presumptions of a comprehensive logical system built upon procedure and
embrace instead an explicit substantive project of optimal regulatory practices.

274

See Hart, supra note 260, at 86, 94, 100.

68

As much epilogue as argument, this Part does not offer a solution to the cycle of
regulatory frustrations that administrative law’s logical system generates. Instead, it draws
connections between the system as it was identified by first generation scholars and as it
currently exists. Looking first at continuity across time in administrative law scholarship, I argue
that even though early scholars lost their arguably blind faith in agencies during the post-war
period, they nevertheless remained in thrall to the logical system they had developed. Second, I
describe the continuity between current and early administrative law casebooks, identifying
themes and structures that continue to dominate the classroom. Finally, I identify continuities
between Arnold’s opposition to that system and contemporary scholars’ dissent to the current
doctrines and practices of administrative law. This historical continuity confirms Arnold’s
insights regarding both the symbolic core of administrative law’s logical system, and the limits
that core places on how, and how much, any effort to reconfigure the system can succeed.
A.

Systemic Continuity.

To claim historical continuity between the administrative law theory of the mid-1930s
and that of seventy years later seems absurd on its face. The intervening decades have witnessed
passage of the Administrative Procedure Act; a vast expansion of the number, type, and province
of regulatory agencies; wide recognition of the administrative state’s legal legitimacy; and, over
the past three decades, recurrent calls for the dismantling of the federal regulatory apparatus.
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But at the same time, viewed from the abstract level of the logical system that first generation
administrative law scholars advocated, the field has been remarkably settled. A recent definition
of administrative law by one of the field’s most important academics would look quite familiar
to scholars of the 1930s:
[Administrative] law defines the structural position of administrative agencies within the
governmental system, specifies the decisional procedures those agencies must follow, and
275

For an overview of this history, see Rabin, Historical Perspective, supra note 3, at 1262-1315.
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determines the availability and scope of review of their actions by the independent
judiciary. It furnishes common principles and procedures that cut horizontally across the
276
many different substantive fields of administration and regulation.
Administrative law scholarship has often claimed to be breaking free of its early
moorings. Even three of the most vocal proponents of administrative agencies during the New
Deal, then-Justice Frankfurter and his former students Louis Jaffe and James Landis, seemed to
abandon their faith in administrative agencies in the decades following World War II and to
require or call for more thorough external checks on agencies’ regulatory discretion.
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Their

movements culminated in Frankfurter’s 1951 opinion in NLRB v. Universal Camera—which
recognized a political “mood” established by Congress that sought enhanced judicial review278—
in the law review articles that resulted in Jaffe’s 1965 book Judicial Control of Administrative
Action—which denounced judicial “self-deprecation and abdication” of agency oversight279—and
in Landis’s 1960 report to President-Elect Kennedy proposing means to increase Executive
control over the federal regulatory bureaucracy.280 In their distrust of agencies and their newly
developed faith in judicial and other external checks on agency discretion, they and others in the
post-war period emphasized that, in Jaffe’s words, “[t]he availability of judicial review is the
necessary condition, psychologically if not logically, of a system of administrative power which
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purports to be legitimate, or legally valid.”281 Indeed, Jaffe went so far as practically to denounce
Landis and The Administrative Process in an article published after Landis’s death, where he
argued that the hopes placed by New Deal advocates in administrative expertise and large federal
regulatory agencies could only last as long as the New Deal’s historical peculiarity.
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Similarly,

in his report to Kennedy, Landis famously expressed his own frustration with the administrative
state by excoriating regulatory agency performance and by proposing significant reforms,
including greater Presidential oversight.283 Within twenty-five years of leading the effort to
establish a modern vision of administrative law, these stalwarts of the first generation seemed to
repudiate their earlier conceptions of the administrative process.
But Arnold’s critique of the “logical system” these first generation figures advocated
demonstrates that although they may have lost faith in what they perceived to be the excesses of
the New Deal regulatory state, they presumed the stability of an underlying system of
administrative law and process. Unlike Arnold, first generation scholars did not want to dispense
with judicial review and, despite their abiding faith in agency expertise, they constructed a
system of institutional tasks and competencies that included loose but still-prevalent checks and
balances.
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As I explained above, even Landis, in a book that enthusiastically advocated

regulation and the administrative state, supported a continuing and central role in the
administrative process for judicial review.285
When their early work is remembered correctly, their later work does not appear to mark
a loss of faith in the administrative process. Justice Frankfurter’s decisions continued to focus on
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jurisdictional issues that restrained judicial intervention into the administrative process,286 while
his opinion in Universal Camera merely sought to reflect and implement a change in legislative
287

direction, and thereby to enforce the wishes of the legislative institution.

As a justice, his

administrative law decisions sought to strike a balance between the integrity of the
administrative process and the integrity of the lower federal courts.288 Jaffe himself noted in an
analysis of Frankfurter’s judicial decisions on administrative law that the jurist’s “point of view”
towards the field that he developed as an academic did not alter in its generalities, though its
specific doctrinal patterns became “less pronounced [and] their application more flexible.”289
Frankfurter’s disciples shared his views. Jaffe did not seek a radical change to the
administrative process or the field of administrative law in the 1950s; instead, he suggested that
faith in the absolute and necessary expertise of agencies was misplaced, and although no formula
could perfectly check administrative discretion, judicial review was especially important “to curb
and correct administrative distortion, to substitute the broad for the narrow view.”290 Nor did
Landis’s report present a radically different vision of the dynamics of administrative law, despite
his greatly increased suspicion of administrative discretion.291 Rather, he proposed incremental
structural solutions to increase presidential oversight and efforts to recruit better agency
personnel.292 The logical system Frankfurter, Landis, and Jaffe advocated was sufficiently
flexible to allow them to remain committed to its dynamic, even as they advocated adjustments
to its precise workings. If agencies were less expert and objective than they had previously
286
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appeared to the leaders of the first generation, then other competent institutions, particularly the
judiciary, could reform agency procedure and organization by tightening the reins and
heightening their scrutiny of agencies—all without calling the system itself into question.
In their structure and focus, contemporary administrative law casebooks show a similar
continuity. They are not significantly distinct from the first great modern administrative law
casebook, Walter Gellhorn’s first text (published in 1940), which moved from early chapters
introducing the administrative state through the structural constitutional issues of the separation
and delegation of powers. It spent the bulk of its time discussing common law and pre-APA
statutory efforts to define fair administrative procedures before concluding with judicial control
293

over administrative determination.

Although sprinkled with significant amounts of

commentary on constitutional issues (including an extended excerpt from an Arnold article on
the symbolic differences between judges and bureaucrats), the Gellhorn casebook used a
traditional case- and court-centered approach.294 Contemporary casebooks—even when they
present significant amounts of theoretical and substantive background material in an introductory
chapter to orient students to the administrative process—continue to take a court-centered
approach that revolves around the role of judicial review and relies upon appellate decisions to
illustrate and explain the relative institutional roles of administrative agencies and the three
governmental branches.295 They still focus as well on procedural issues and on administrative
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discretion.296 The most significant departure from the current pedagogical norm are casebooks
that focus separately on administrative procedure in certain specific areas of substantive
regulation and emphasize more clearly the nature and purpose of agencies’ regulatory mandates.
But they largely reconfigure the traditional emphasis on judicial review by considering it on an
agency-by-agency basis, and by bracketing the substantive regulatory material in discrete, early
297

sections.

Thus, the substance and pedagogy of the academic field reveals the extent to which

the institution- and procedure-focused approach of first generation scholarship remains
dominant.
B.

The Continuity of Crisis and Dissent.

As it appears in casebooks, administrative law today may look relatively similar to the
field as it emerged from the 1930s, but continuity should not be mistaken for theoretical
ossification. As I noted in the Introduction, administrative law as a body of doctrine and an
academic field has faced recurring political crises over allegations that agencies impose unfair or
inefficient regulatory practices, are subject to capture by regulated industries or public interest
298

groups, or are simply incompetent.

As the first generation scholars themselves demonstrated

during the 1950s, these bouts of frustration have forced the field to rethink at least some of its
assumptions about agency discretion and judicial review. To what extent have these crises
affected the foundations of administrative law as they were established by the field’s first
generation?
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Consider first an especially well-known instance of a scholar identifying a particular
crisis and its resolution: Richard Stewart’s important article in 1975 noting the breakdown of
what he termed the “traditional model” of judicial review and formal procedures, and the
emergence of a largely court-imposed, pluralist model of administrative process in which
agencies are required to consider a fair representation of affected interests in their rulemaking
procedures.
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Viewed from Arnold’s perspective, new, additional procedural requirements did

not shake the foundations of administrative law. Interest representation, and related statutory
efforts to open the records and meetings of the administrative process that became law in the
1960s and 1970s,300 are procedural fixes to political legitimacy crises, imposing statutory rights
and common law changes on administrative procedures without directly affecting the systematic
logic of the administrative state. Although they may have complicated and inhibited agency
operations and judicial review,301 representation and participation have not significantly
diminished administrative law’s faith in procedure, institutional competencies, and legalcentrism—indeed, they have reinforced the assumption that procedural requirements placed upon
agencies and enforced by judicial review lead to better substantive policy.
Some contemporary critics, however, have suggested more radical changes—changes
that, by moving away from traditional conceptions of administrative law as doctrine and
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academic field, resemble Arnold’s critique of the procedural and conceptual core of first
generation scholarship. A small sampling of such criticism reveals their parallels to Arnold’s
earlier dissent. As a system, some critics argue, administrative law is fatally flawed. It is
excessively adversarial and legalistic in its approach to regulation, and thereby imposes
unnecessary, and otherwise avoidable, social and economic costs to the regulatory process.
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Its

focus on judicial review invites interference in the administrative, and especially the rulemaking,
process.303 It is based on a premodern sensibility and understanding of the administrative state as
quasi-legislative and quasi-adjudicative, and thereby misunderstands and impedes modern,
instrumentally rational agency operations.304 And with its hierarchical, tightly structured system,
it cannot reckon with the role private entities increasingly play in public governance and the
opportunities that this role offers for interdependent relationships between private and public
realms.305 Similar criticism condemns administrative law as an academic field for its excessive
focus on the judiciary, which renders it unable to consider the extent to which internal
administrative processes operate outside the control of judicial review,306 as well as for its related
failure to develop a theory of regulation that can account for the dynamics of regulatory practice
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and policy formation.307 Finally, the entire growing body of literature applying public choice and
positive political theory to administrative agencies challenges the naiveté of first generation
scholarship. Far from a logical system of competent institutions with sufficient internal checks
to protect the rule of law, public choice scholars argue, the administrative state is composed
largely of self-interested actors seeking to maximize individual and institutional capital.
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And

far from being reasoned objective means to control discretion and legitimate agency action,
positive political theory scholars tell us, administrative procedures are merely means by which
legislators protect their own political interests and those private interests they represent.309
These are inherently functional critiques, asserting that no matter the symbolic value of a
system built on conceptions of pre-constituted, legitimating procedures and institutions, what
may have once appeared to be a logical system now obstructs the administrative state from either
achieving the goals set out by its political masters or realizing the potential benefits of its expert
bureaucracy. Not all of these critics propose radical reform—indeed some, like first generation
scholars who sought to reform the system in the 1950s, would merely rejigger judicial standards
of review310—but all challenge what first generation scholars took as an article of faith, namely
that administrative law is concerned with designing legal and administrative processes that lead,
inexorably, to legitimate and optimal regulatory results. They represent a trend towards focusing
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on substantive consequence, rather than system, procedure, and form.311 As such, these criticisms
echo frustrations that Arnold first voiced, frustrations regarding how the first generation scholars
conceived of the administrative state, as well as whether and how administrative law could
legitimate and tame agencies. Reconsidering Arnold and the foundational efforts of first
generation scholarship enables a clearer picture of the difficulties and stakes of administrative
law reform.
Conclusion
In 1935, Arnold quipped that administrative law provided a “Redeemer” for the modern
state in the guise of a logical system;312 in the intervening years, it has served that purpose for
law professors who revere, obsess over, and complain about its emphasis on procedure,
institutional competencies, and judicial review. Arnold correctly predicted both the success of
that emphasis and the frustrations it would create. The failure of his proposals, which offered no
logical system or symbolic substance to attract and inspire the field, also proves his point. It is a
point worthy of consideration for contemporary efforts to reform administrative law in order to
achieve substantive, normative ends: Administrative law needs its legitimating symbols, its
logical systems. To forget or neglect that is to court failure.313
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